

# Military Intelligence



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**A NEW  
FOCUS**

# Military Intelligence

**PB 34-91-2 APRIL-JUNE 1991**

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# VANTAGE POINT

## Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.

In the last issue of *Military Intelligence*, I said I would address challenges facing our branch. I intend to do that; but first, I want to describe the magnificent effort our Military Intelligence Community made in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. I want to stress that this was a total community effort with national agencies, DA, INSCOM, FORSCOM, USAREUR, the Program Executive Officer for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (PEOIEW), ASPO, AMC, Special Repair Activities, contractors, and the Intelligence Center working to support our units and personnel deployed in theater to provide the best intelligence possible to commands in the Persian Gulf area.

In addition to the scores of MI personnel on staffs ranging from CENTCOM and ARCENT down to maneuver battalion, our Army commitment in theater included major elements of one INSCOM EAC MI brigade; two corps MI brigades, plus Aerial Exploitation Battalions from two others; seven divisional MI battalions; and the MI companies supporting two ACRs. All are to be congratulated for their absolutely superb performance, not only in providing responsive intelligence support to commanders, but also in maintaining spectacular operational readiness rates throughout their employment.

Here at the Intelligence Center, we picked up new responsibilities when we assumed command of Fort Huachuca. Namely, we became a major mobilization center for Reserve Component (RC) units, mobilizing 10 RC units and deploying nine of them with over 1,800 personnel; 2,100 vehicles, and nine million pounds of equipment. Our RC training responsibilities also expanded significantly. We trained 38 officers in the S2 sections of four mobilized National Guard Brigades and their subordinate battalions, and prepared ourselves for a potentially large IRR student load. We mobilized 55 members of the 6th and 4th Army Intelligence Training Army Area Schools to support this effort. In addition, we accelerated all our active component courses, training through the normal Christmas holiday break, and we sent eight mobile training teams and four new equipment training teams to Saudi Arabia. We also trained over 400 Kuwaiti students who had

enlisted in the Kuwaiti Army. We also deployed personnel to operate six ground station modules to downlink the prototype JSTARS system, which performed superbly, and our Pioneer UAV platoon, which also contributed significantly.

With the Electronic Proving Ground, we developed and sent to Saudi Arabia four prototype voice intercept trainers to train non-Arabic linguists to recognize Iraqi dialect and over 900 Iraqi military phrases. We developed a concept to field an expanded TROJAN system to provide dedicated communications support to intelligence operations in theater. With DA and INSCOM support, we fielded 13 commercial, portable satellite terminals to MI units and staffs in Saudi Arabia. These terminals enabled them to communicate among themselves and to access the entire TROJAN network through the TROJAN switch. They also provided direct access to various Army and national level agencies.

We deployed our Artificial Intelligence Module Test Bed (AIMTB) with all VII Corps units and also provided it to ARCENT. The AIMTB has good intelligence functionality, and we added new software through programmers in country and here via the TROJAN terminal at Fort Huachuca to all systems in Saudi Arabia. We also worked closely with FORSCOM to enable the AIMTB to interoperate with their highly functional FORSCOM Automated Intelligence Support System (FAISS) which was widely fielded to deployed FORSCOM units. The AIMTB and FAISS can exchange digital updates with each other which generate new graphic displays. This can be done over TROJAN or FORSCOM's nondevelopmental item HF communications system, GOLDWING, or via VHF/PSC-2. Our Intelligence Center software engineers also developed and deployed a Host Computer Interface (HCI) which permitted the AIMTB and FAISS systems to talk to other PCs and even laptop computers and to use them as relays with the communications means described above. In coordination with ASPO, FORSCOM also developed a version of FAISS capable of receiving and displaying secondary imagery. We sent New Equipment Training Teams to teach units how to use TROJAN, AIMTB, and HCI; our trainers also supported

*(Continued on page 45)*



## Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson

This is my first column in the Professional Bulletin as the MI Corps Sergeant Major. I feel very fortunate to have been selected to serve our Corps in this capacity. There's no doubt the job will be both demanding and rewarding.

I want to use a portion of this first column to talk to MI sergeants. As a sergeant, you have a very tough, demanding, but important job. You and the soldiers you lead are the major pulse points of the Corps. It's at your level where the fundamental work is done. Sergeants are the role models; they set the example. If you set the right example, the soldiers you touch will carry a part of you with them forever.

Sergeants know when they're performing to the standards expected of them. Their soldiers will let them know in a hurry if they fall short of expectations. Sergeants must inspire soldiers to be more than they ever thought they could be. I challenge every NCO in MI to rise to the challenge, set high standards, and never compromise those standards. Our young soldiers expect the sergeant to lead and teach them: that's your job.

As I take my position, my thoughts also turn to the future. I don't have a crystal ball and can't predict outcomes in advance. However, many events are taking place that will set the future course of the Army and its MI soldiers around the world. DESERT STORM is a major victory in the Middle East; and our soldiers have been performing admirably, not only in theater but also in major supporting roles in FORSCOM, TRADOC, INSCOM, AIA, and many other commands and joint agencies. As MI soldiers performed their jobs in Operation DESERT STORM, they learned many valuable lessons. They gained knowledge and experience that can only be acquired through combat experience. That experience will be used to shape the future.

As we test doctrine and systems in combat, we need to improve and fix them. Part of our mission is to use feedback from the field to improve our capabilities. As we look to the future, the systems being designed are more sophisticated, more capable, and more technically advanced. As always, we need your feedback on how to do our business better and smarter.

Several events have occurred recently that

will, hopefully, get us where we're headed with the least disruption. Some of these developments are still in the concept stage, but others are further along. Let me tell you about some of the things that are happening. We're in the process of staffing several MOS actions. We've proposed a new MOS for the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and have identified it as Launch and Recovery Specialist, 96U. We're also developing a linguist MOS (97L) for the Reserve Component. DA has approved our consolidation of MOSs 33M, P, and T into 33Y, effective October 1, 1991. We're also looking at other MOS consolidations or adjustments to ensure we're using our outstanding personnel properly in these dynamic times.

As a final thought, it's important to remember changes don't happen overnight. Many talented people are working hard to make your task easier and more productive, and we continue to need your input in this process.



# FROM THE EDITOR

Greetings!

DESERT STORM has ended successfully, and hopefully everyone will be headed home soon. However, as intelligence professionals, we must retain a strong interest in and understanding of the politics, culture, and military systems of the Southwest Asian nations. Although the war was short, the peace that follows will be a relatively long process, and our nation will have a key role to play. This means that, as analysts, our job in the region is a long way from being done.

For this reason, I've chosen to publish articles that discuss significant military, historical, and cultural aspects of the region. If some of the information is a little outdated by the time you see it, remember that we finalize what we produce about six weeks before it's published. Remember, as well, that even though key players may change, as well as numbers and names of organizations, the basic situation in a nation like Iraq is not likely to change much in the long run.

We've had a large increase in the number of articles submitted over the last three months. We intend to use many of them, but some may not be published for a couple of issues. Obviously, the more time sensitive a topic is, the quicker we need to work it into our production schedule. So don't get too concerned if I've told you I'll publish your article and you haven't seen it yet. I'd love to publish larger issues, but because of the low ratio of paid subscriptions to free unit ones we can't afford to do so, as most of the increased cost would come out of our already tight operating budget.

On the subject of free unit subscriptions, we have had to scale back the number we mail. We can only send one free copy to each S2/G2 shop or MI company level unit. Non-MI units or organizations may no longer receive free subscriptions. We have to do this to keep our costs down. One way you can help is to buy a personal subscription. Here's why this will help: The more total copies we print, the lower the cost per individual copy. An increase in private subscribers will boost circulation, and we can then afford to print a better quality, larger magazine without incurring significantly larger expenses. We could also send more free unit copies at government expense, as the individual copies would be cheaper.

We have a new assistant editor on board. Annette Castro replaces Irene B. Pease, who retired in November. She has a lot of experience, and we're glad to have her with us. At the same time, though, we have to say goodbye to Hermelinda Rodriguez, our typesetter. She has done a fantastic job for us for many years, and we will miss her a lot. She's the one who gives the magazine its professional look.

We appreciate the steady stream of articles, book reviews, and private subscriptions we've been receiving. Please keep them coming!

Sincerely,

*John A. Horvath*



# LETTERS

## Dear Editor:

I was delighted to see the emphasis on foreign language requirements and training in your October-December 90 issue. As an MI Officer and Foreign Area Officer with 15 years in overseas assignments, I would like to add an emphatic exclamation point to the points made by Colonel Wesley A. Groesbeck and Chief Warrant Officer Two Timothy E. Jones.

While I support the use of research and technology in finding scientific ways to cross the language barrier, the key to success lies in the skills and techniques of our linguist personnel. As the Army gets smaller and the world becomes an intense environment of potential stress, language capability becomes an even more important asset.

It's also gratifying to see strong support for language training from such outstanding senior professionals as Colonel Terry McCarty, whom I have been privileged to know as a friend and colleague for over 20 years. Incidentally, his biographic sketch failed to mention that he is a linguist.

During my career I've become a linguist in three Southeast Asian languages, and most recently used my Burmese to good effect as Defense Attache in Burma during three years of intense political conflict and violence in that unfortunate country. Soldiers who went to Panama and the Middle East have doubtless found that language skills have been of immense benefit.

Unfortunately, we don't have enough skilled linguists to provide a combat multiplier at full effect. It's essential that the Army in general, and the MI Branch in particular, continue to stress the need for linguists at every level and to provide realistic training and educational opportunities for our soldiers so they can maintain their linguistic skills.

**Colonel John B. Haseman**  
Defense and Army Attache  
Jakarta, Indonesia

## Dear Editor:

After reading Captain Chris A. Pilecki's "After Perestroika: A New, Improved Communist Threat?" (written in response to my article "The New Threat," January-March 1990), I felt compelled to write. I believe the author misunderstood my entire premise. The main argument of my article was that the Soviet Union, by reforming its economy and entire political framework, has the **potential** to become an even greater threat to U.S. interests in the years to come, not necessarily overnight.

Since my article was published, Gorbachev has continued his campaign of "New Thinking." If anything, attempts at economic reform are more daring now than ever. These economic reforms, if successful, may lead to a stronger Soviet Union in terms of economic base, military potential, and ideological acceptance in the long run. This is painfully simple: A nation's success in the economic realm is by far the major determinant of its power,


both economic and military. Paul Kennedy's work **The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers** illustrates not only this point but also the interdependence between military power and economic might.

Whether or not the Soviet Union remains "communist" is not relevant to the threat it poses to the United States. In recent times, ideologies merely made it easy to legitimize policies and divide the participants into "us and them." For four decades these differences in ideologies have been a primary justification for the growth of our defense establishment. The ideology isn't what has really mattered, but rather that Soviet national interests have been contrary to ours. It was much easier just to rally behind "ideologies" than scrutinize our national interests and the world around us.

Captain Pilecki might believe that nations of similar economic systems are immediately friendly to one another, if not allies, but a quick glance at history shows otherwise. For centuries, Great Britain and France, as functioning monarchies, fought one another. They had similar economic systems and ideologies; however, they fought when their national interests conflicted. The U.S. and USSR are likely to be superpowers for some time, and there is a great potential that our national interests will not always be similar.

Pilecki also misunderstood my statement that the Soviet Union has upstaged the United

*(Continued on page 47)*



By Aaron Danis

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein's elite Republican Guard forces invaded and overran Kuwait in less than 12 hours. Despite Iraq's various rationalizations, the real reason for this surprise invasion was to settle long-standing territorial and financial claims against Kuwait.<sup>1</sup> Without question, Hussein's army was the premier Arab military force in the Persian Gulf; Kuwait's resources would have made Iraq an economic powerhouse as well. In an era when offensive prowess by Arab armies is nearly nonexistent, Iraq was the exception, launching large, well-planned attacks.

This analysis outlines and evaluates Iraqi army doctrine and operations, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. This article reviews Iraq's performance in the Iran-Iraq War during its 1980-88 defensive operations and its stunning offensive victories during the spring and summer of 1988—victories which brought Iran to the peace table after 8 years of war. Although the Iraqi army of 1988 and later is more professional and battle-tested than it was during its ponderous 1980-81 offensives,<sup>2</sup> it has glaring weakness-

es. As DESERT STORM has shown, a U.S. armor-heavy force can exploit these to defeat the Iraqis in battle.

### **Iraqi Force Structure**

The Iraqi army had over 5,500 tanks in the field at the start of DESERT STORM, but the majority of its force structure consisted of 40 to 50 infantry divisions, the mainstay of Iraqi defenses.<sup>3</sup> Iraq's offensive punch was concentrated in the Republican Guards Forces Command (RGFC), also referred to as the Presidential Guards. During much of Iraq's war with Iran, the Guards were merely a brigade/division-sized force held in reserve to spearhead critical counterattacks. In 1987, this force was expanded to two armored divisions, one infantry, one mechanized infantry, and one commando/special forces brigade for the spring 1988 offensives. To prepare for the Kuwaiti invasion, Iraq expanded the Guards by three infantry divisions and a Special Forces division, giving it a total strength of eight divisions with 120,000 troops.<sup>4</sup>

After Hussein invaded Kuwait, he quickly withdrew the Guards and placed them near the Iraq-Kuwait border to act as a theater reserve. This






Figure 1. Iraqi Corps Organization.

shows how important the Guards were to Iraq's counteroffensive plans, but they are also important psychologically, much as the Old Guard was to Napoleon's army in the early 1800's. Although defeated in DESERT STORM, the Guards are the cream of the Iraqi army. They are thought to be fiercely loyal to Hussein, and for their loyalty they are rewarded with preferential treatment and perks.

Before DESERT STORM, Iraq also had seven other armored/mechanized divisions. Iraqi armored units, along with the infantry divisions, are organized into seven corps (Figure 1).<sup>5</sup> These corps are quite flexible, with no set number of divisions or brigades assigned (although four divisions are the norm). This flexibility extends to the division level, although regular army divisions usually have three brigades with 10,000 to 12,000 troops. The RGFC divisions command four or more brigades with 15,000 troops, as well as independent helicopter, artillery, and chemical units.<sup>6</sup>

The brigade is the basic building block of Iraq's army, and normally the lowest level where independent operations occur. By comparing armored brigade unit structures, you can see the vast size

and equipment superiority of the RGFC units over the regulars, with an extra 15 to 20 tanks per battalion and two battalions of self-propelled artillery attached (Figure 2). Similar differences exist between RGFC and regular army mechanized and leg infantry brigades. Also note the commando units organic to all brigades. These are used for scouting and shallow infiltration, as well as rear-area heliborne assaults.<sup>7</sup> Pre-DESERT STORM aggregate numbers of Iraqi armored vehicles were—

- 2,500 T-54/55's.
- 1,500 T-59/69's.
- 100 PT-76's.
- 1,000 T-62's.
- 500+ T-72's (estimate).
- 1,000 BMP 1/2's.<sup>8</sup>

The T-72's and BMPs are concentrated almost exclusively in the RGFC units. The regular armored units have the older T-55/62's and their variants, as well as older APCs.

#### Perfecting the Defense: 1981-1987

Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 after a series of border provocations by both sides. After initial Iraqi territorial gains against Iran in 1980-81, the Ira-




Figure 2. Comparison of RGFC and Regular Army Units.

nians wrested the initiative from Iraq through a series of large-scale offensives. The war became a defensive one for the Iraqi army, going on the offensive only to maintain the integrity of the defense. Operationally, the Iraqi army had ample opportunity to practice defensive techniques and doctrine, usually against Iranian human-wave assaults largely unsupported by armor, artillery, or close air support (CAS). The Iranians made up for their lack of supporting arms by using infantry infiltration tactics in night attacks across the many water obstacles which criss-cross southern Iraq near Basra and the Faw Peninsula.

Iraq's operational doctrine for offense and defense is partly based on the Soviet model taught by Russian advisors. (Later Iraq would incorporate American and British doctrinal concepts and adapt them as necessary.) In the 1980-81 offensives, this hurt the Iraqis because they didn't execute Soviet doctrine correctly; and junior officers and NCOs, though brave, lacked initiative and often waited for higher headquarters to provide direction. Defensively, however, when the Iraqis were forced to defend their home soil, Soviet prepared defense tactics made the

critical difference because it provided a strong "crust" to protect Baghdad. If the Iraqi army lacked anything defensively, it was strategic depth and manpower reserves. Baghdad is only 150 kilometers from the Iranian border, so trading space for time was out of the question. Also, any battle with enemy losses less than three to one was considered a defeat. (Iran's population in 1980 was 45 million; Iraq's was 15 million).

Iraqi defenses usually consisted of three dug-in defensive bands, about 8 kilometers wide and 10 kilometers deep for an infantry or mechanized division sector, with an 8 kilometer deep forward security zone manned by the divisional reconnaissance battalion. Divisions deployed two brigades forward, and each of the brigade sectors had battalion triangle-shaped strong points. These provided all-around protection through the use of alternate firing positions and dug-in armor positions which obscured tanks to hull defilade (Figure 3). Strong points had interlocking fire and they were covered by massed artillery and CAS, due to Iraq's air superiority throughout the Iran-Iraq War.<sup>9</sup>

The Combat Engineer Corps was one of the great assets of Iraq's army; they constructed con-




Figure 3. Defensive Battalion-size Triangular Strongpoint.

Computer Graphics:  
Kazuko A. Kiever

crete fortifications, minefields, tank ditches, and other obstacles. They also built lateral roads to reposition forces, because early in the war Iraqi units had trouble reinforcing and redeploying units once their positions had been outflanked, due to poor command and control.<sup>10</sup> A brigade (armored, if possible) was kept in reserve behind the division tactical command post, which was located to the rear of and centered on the two forward brigades.

***"Iraq first used mustard gas in 1982-83 to disrupt night human-wave assaults, and...whenever they were greatly outnumbered."***

Despite Iraq's great technological, mobility, and firepower advantages, Iran's human-wave assaults nearly overwhelmed them on several occasions, with penetrations up to 16 kilometers. The lack of mobile reserves prevented Iran from exploiting success, and Iraq's massive use of air support (including Mi-25 and Gazelle attack helicopters), combined with local counterattacks, usually restored the line.<sup>11</sup> As a last line of defense, Iraq turned to chemical weapons. Iraq first used mustard gas in 1982-83 to disrupt night human-wave assaults, and, thereafter, whenever they were greatly outnumbered or defending an important position. Iraq later used Tabun and Sarin nerve gases and cyanotic agents. However, chemicals were not usually decisive in and of themselves; the Iranians developed countermeasures, and the effects of weather lessened the impact of the chemicals.<sup>12</sup>

**Mobile Defense: The Battle of Susangerd**

Until the battle of Susangerd, Iraq's army had not been involved in many defensive mobile battles. The battle of Susangerd was the only major tank battle of the Iran-Iraq War (and the largest since the 1973 October war). This battle provides a rare look at Iraq's "mobile" defensive capabilities. In January 1981, an understrength Iranian armored division (equipped with 300 British Chieftains and American M-60's), supported by a paratroop brigade, counterattacked near Susangerd, Iran. An Iraqi armored division

equipped with 300 T-62 tanks had come to a halt with three brigades on line. Iraqi helicopter reconnaissance detected the Iranian movement, and the Iraqi commander responded quickly by concentrating his three armored brigades on the Kharkheh Plain.<sup>13</sup>

On January 6, the lead Iranian armored brigade ran into the center Iraqi one. Thinking it was only a light Iraqi covering force, the Iranians pushed forward as the Iraqis withdrew, pulling the Iranians into a prepared kill zone. As tank-to-tank engagements raged, the Iraqi commander moved his two flank brigades up to form a three-sided trap, and faced his units inward. The first Iranian brigade was soon destroyed, losing over 100 tanks. The second and third Iranian armored brigades, unsupported by their infantry, blundered into the trap on January 7 and 8, respectively. Each side began with about 300 tanks. The Iraqis claimed they destroyed or captured 214 Iranian tanks. The Iraqis probably lost 100 destroyed or damaged tanks, but since they retained the battlefield these were probably recovered.<sup>14</sup>

Due to the incompetence of the Iranian commander, it's difficult to judge the true quality, by Western standards, of the Iraqi force in this battle. It did demonstrate, however, that both sides were technically deficient in tank warfare. Most Iranian losses occurred because their tanks got stuck, or could not be supplied and maintained and were abandoned. The lead computing sights on Iraqi tanks were seldom used, thus lowering the accuracy of the T-62 main gun to World War II standards. Reliable reports indicate both sides often had to close to within bore-sight range to be effective.<sup>15</sup> We don't know whether the Iraqis have corrected these training deficiencies with their T-72 crews, although they've tried to improve fire control systems on the tank by using Western range-finders and computers.<sup>16</sup>

**Back on the Offensive: 1988**

By 1988, after 6 years of stalemate and the primacy of the defense over the offense (reminiscent of World War I), most Gulf analysts believed that neither side would gain the upper hand in the war. Iran was expected to conduct yet another "final offensive" in the winter-spring of 1988; however, two subtle, yet important, actions were taking place in both countries:

- Iran was suffering from mobilization problems in the winter of 1988. Political problems due to the "War of the Cities" and a shortage of



volunteers for the front prevented the expected winter offensive and may have caused the Iranians to thin their lines.<sup>17</sup>

• Iraq began to modify its force structure in late 1987, expanding the Republican Guards as previously noted. These highly seasoned forces practiced offensive combined arms operations during the winter of 1988.<sup>18</sup>

***"The lead computing sights on Iraqi tanks were seldom used, thus lowering the accuracy of the T-62 main gun to World War II standards."***

Under these conditions, Saddam Hussein decided to launch a major attack to seize the Al Faw (or Fao) Peninsula west of the Shatt-al Arab waterway which divides Iraq and Iran and allows access to the Iraqi port of Basra. Iran had captured Faw, on the Iraqi Gulf coast, in 1986; this was their only major gain since 1982. The Iranians defended the peninsula with only 5,000 to 10,000 regulars and Revolutionary Guards because it was such an exposed and untenable position. The Iraqi attack, titled "Blessed Ramadan," began on the first day of the Moslem month of fasting and came as a complete surprise to the Iranians. Faw's recapture gave a psychological boost to Hussein's military, and served as a springboard for a campaign of five attacks from April to July 1988 which would push the Iranians out of Iraq.<sup>19</sup>

Part of the operational surprise was due to Iraq's ability to concentrate its forces quickly before the attack. Using excellent interior lines of communication (both road and rail) covered by air support, Iraq moved the Republican Guards 150 kilometers from a training area near Basra to jump-off positions on the Gulf coast northwest of Al Faw. The Iraqi army had 1,500 tank transporters which can move armored vehicles at speeds up to 65 kilometers per hour (the result of a lesson learned in the 1973 October War, when Iraqi tanks, sent to Syria to fight Israel, drove on their tracks on rough roads and arrived in poor shape).<sup>20</sup>

The Al Faw attack was planned as a 4- or 5-day operation with three phases: breakthrough,

exploitation, and mop-up. On the morning of April 17, almost 200,000 troops attacked on two axes down the Faw Peninsula. T-72-equipped armored units of the Republican Guards assaulted southeast across the relatively dry salt flats of Mamlaha from positions around Al Zubair and Umm Qasr. The Iraqi VII Corps, located 16 kilometers north of Faw City, launched an infantry attack south along the west bank of the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq also launched an amphibious assault west of the Iranian positions using the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan.<sup>21</sup>

The attack on the Iranians was preceded by a short bombardment, which probably included the use of a nonpersistent nerve gas. Under cover of darkness, Iraqi commandos cut paths through Iranian defensive barriers and minefields, followed by armor which was supported by infantry and attack helicopters. The Iraqis claimed they flew some 318 air sorties by fighter bombers and helicopters, helping to prevent Iranian reinforcements from reaching Faw. The attack, which was expected to last 4 or 5 days, ended in 34 hours.

Iraq rapidly followed up on its Faw victory. On June 26, taking advantage again of their superior mobility, the Republican Guards and III Corps retook the man-made, oil-rich Majnun (or Majnoon) Islands north of Basra in 9 hours. The Guards launched the main attack at 0330 hours, this time an amphibious one, storming the islands and surrounding marshes from small boats and amphibious tractors. Bridging assets and bulldozers followed to consolidate the gains.

***"In five attacks, over a span of 5 months, Iraq retook all the land lost to Iran over a span of 8 years."***

The III Corps, with 2,000 tanks and 600 artillery pieces versus less than 60 Iranian tanks, cleared the area east of the islands. A brigade of paratroopers (possibly a commando brigade) supported III Corps as they were inserted inside Iran as a blocking force. The III Corps advanced 32 kilometers into Iran before withdrawing to the international border.<sup>22</sup> We don't know if the paratroops were dropped or air-assaulted into their objective, although Iraq has enough transport aircraft and helicopters for either. (Films of the

Kuwait invasion showed an air assault into Kuwait City in support of the attack.) Iran and Iraq finally agreed to a U.N.-sponsored cease-fire on August 20, 1988. In five attacks, over a span of 5 months, Iraq retook all the land lost to Iran over a span of 8 years.

Common threads link these attacks:

- Offensive actions were extensively rehearsed and had a set-piece quality about them (for example, little free-wheeling maneuver and limited distances).

- Iraq built up odds which easily exceeded 10 to 1, and it prepositioned massive logistics.

- All attacks were preceded by a nonpersistent nerve gas strike on frontline troops and mustard gas attacks on logistic targets, command posts, and reserves.<sup>23</sup>

- Iraq had overwhelming air superiority.

- Iranian defenses were thin, with almost no reserves.

Every battle appeared to be a foregone conclusion before it even began. And except for the chemical strikes, this scenario seems to fit the recent Kuwaiti invasion quite well.

#### **Iraq Today: Lessons for the U.S.**

You can't assess the Iraqi army's performance against the United States by its performance in the Iran-Iraq War. But by studying that war you can gain insight into how Iraqi political and military leaders think. This is important, because even with DESERT STORM's end our country will have interests in the Persian Gulf for a long time to come.

For most of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq faced an opponent which had the majority of its air and armored forces deadlined due to a lack of spare parts and maintenance. By the end of the war, Iran's greatest resource—manpower—had also been drained due to senseless human-wave attacks against strong defenses. DESERT STORM presented an entirely different set of circumstances for Iraq; however, several salient points can be drawn about the Iraqi army:

***"Non-Guards units have been incapable of performing offensive combined-arms maneuvers due to a lack of training."***

- Iraq's elite Guards units have seen extensive combat and have been baptized in chemical warfare. Iraqi leaders had good reason to be confident in their performance under degraded conditions. If the Guards units are rebuilt, they will continue to be a threat in the region. Non-Guards units and People's Army militia are of uneven or poor quality.

- Guards units are good in set-piece attacks of limited distance, which they have rehearsed extensively. Non-Guards units have been incapable of performing offensive combined-arms maneuvers due to a lack of training.

- The Iraqi army has had a lot of defensive experience, and has excellent engineer support (both offensively and defensively). The Iranians had limited success with night attacks and infiltration tactics, but DESERT STORM marks Iraq's first experience with a large, combined-arms assault. Due to poor C<sup>3</sup>, Iraqi defenses were slow to react to mobile situations. The Iraqis may draw their own lessons learned from DESERT STORM.

- Iraqi troops could previously look up knowing Iraqi airplanes and helicopters were overhead. This was not the case in DESERT STORM, but if the Iraqis preserved a major portion of their air force, they can still pose a combined arms threat to the region. Air defense artillery assets have older Soviet missiles, and were not integrated against a legitimate threat.

- Due to the limited depth of the Iran-Iraq theater and Iraqi air superiority, the Iraqi logistic system was rarely taxed. Press reports indicate Iraqi troops were poorly supplied during most of this conflict. This reflects a lack of Iraqi logistic experience and capability, as well as effective U.S. interdiction. Once again, Iraq will learn some lessons from this war.

As General Colin Powell stated after the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqis were not "10-feet tall." In the ground war, U.S. armor-heavy forces quickly exploited Iraqi weaknesses. Current Iraqi defenses and C<sup>3</sup> proved incapable of responding to such a threat. Denied air superiority, they usually folded under pressure. Defensively, U.S. forces submitted Iraqi offenses to a volume of tank fire, antitank guided missiles, and CAS much greater than what they faced from the Iranian army. However, Iraq's wild card against any adversary, present or future, is chemical weapons, although desert conditions don't favor their employment. If Iraq survives the conflict with these weapons, as well as with their SCUD

*(Continued on page 48)*



# THE FAW

## PENINSULA: A Battle Analysis

By Captain Michael E. Bigelow

After seven and a half years of mostly defensive operations in the war between Iran and Iraq, Iraq reached a major turning point: The Faw Peninsula battle. This battle marked the beginning of the Iraqi offensives that eventually forced a cease-fire in the war. On April 17, 1988, the Iraqi VII Corps and elite Republican Guards attacked Iranian positions on the Faw Peninsula in southeastern Iraq. Thirty-six hours later, the peninsula was back in Iraqi hands. The victory signaled the reversal of military posture: The Iraqis had gained the initiative.

As intelligence professionals, we often turn to history to gain insights into potential enemies. Although the study of history has limitations for this purpose, the Faw Peninsula Battle can help us better understand Iraq's army. I chose this battle because of its historical significance and

because it offers lessons on how deception and training can help military operations. It demonstrates that the Iraqis were adaptable in solving problems, as they changed their defensive army into an offensive weapon. Lastly, it gives some insight into the creation and purpose of Iraq's elite Republican Guards.

### Uncertain Data

In studying the Iran-Iraq War, the greatest limitation, especially at the unclassified level, is the scarcity of reliable sources and data. While there are many sources of general information, few go into tactical details, especially about the 1988 Iraqi offensives. Moreover, as Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst of the Middle East, points out, "There are no real 'experts' on the war, only 'students,' and even the most informed students often disagree."<sup>1</sup> This disagreement stems from the flood of propaganda and false claims that characterized the war. As a



result, available details are often uncertain and conflicting.

### Strategic Setting

The Iran-Iraq War was the most costly and bloody war since World War II. The war resulted from a variety of factors, including deep-seated ethnic (Arab versus Persian) and religious (Sunni versus Shi'ite) rivalries. Both countries wanted to dominate the region. The war's more immediate sparks were the animosity between Iraq's President Saddam Hussein and Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, and their dispute over a key waterway, the Shatt al-Arab.

The war began with Iraq's invasion of Iran in September 1980. Iraqi forces made quick progress, seizing 1,000 kilometers of southwest Iran. By late October, however, the Iranians had slowed the invasion to a crawl. In January 1981, Iran launched a counteroffensive near Susangerd, but the Iraqi defenders easily defeated it. After this, the conflict settled into a static war.

In the spring of 1981, Iran unveiled its "human-wave" attacks. Using these attacks, Iran made significant gains which set the stage for two large-scale offensives in March and May 1982. In March, Iranian forces penetrated Iraqi lines west of Dezful and forced the Iraqi troops back to the border region east of Al Amarah. In May, the Iranian offensive recaptured most of Khuzistan, including the port of Khorramshahr. By July, the Iranian forces attacked into Iraq, near Basra, Iraq's second largest city, but were repulsed.

For the next five years, the war became one of attrition. In 1983 and 1984, Iran launched massive World War I-style offensives that led to heavy casualties but few gains. In 1984, the "Tanker War" began as both countries attacked each other's and neutral merchant shipping. In 1985, Iraq and then Iran launched offensives; neither was successful. While the ground war stagnated, both Iraq and Iran conducted air and missile campaigns against population centers and economic targets.<sup>2</sup>

In February 1986, Iran launched a two-pronged offensive on the Basra front. The Iraqis defeated the northern prong toward Basra. But this prong was a diversion, and kept Iraq preoccupied with the defense of Basra. This aided the southern assault against the Faw Peninsula. Under the cover of darkness and poor weather, the Iranians made an amphibious assault across

the Shatt al-Arab. They moved through the poorly prepared Iraqi defenses and captured the abandoned port of Al Faw. By the time the Iraqis organized a counterattack, the Iranians were firmly established in the peninsula. Despite the fact that Iraq used some of its best units, led by its best combat commanders, the counterattack failed to budge the Iranians.<sup>3</sup>

By itself, the Iranian success on the Faw Peninsula did little to break the stalemate of the Iran-Iraq War. While the Iraqis failed to dislodge the Iranians, the Iranians could do little with their foothold. The loss of the peninsula, however, had shaken President Hussein. It forced the Iraqi leader to rethink his defensive strategy and find a way to return to the offensive. This shift paved the way for the 1988 Iraqi offensives.

### Iranian Military System

In early 1988, Iran seemed to be winning the war of attrition. Its infantry-dominated army had maintained the initiative since late 1981 and had made some gains in Iraq. However, Iran couldn't bring its 3 to 1 manpower advantage (15 million versus Iraq's 5 million) to bear; and its army's effectiveness was hampered by several major problems.

***"When the Iranians used infiltration tactics, tactical surprise, and properly controlled 'human-wave' assaults, they were able to offset the superior weaponry of Iraq's army."***

In 1988, the 655,000-man Iranian army consisted of the *Pasdaran* and the Regular Army. The *Pasdaran*, or Revolutionary Guards, evolved from a vigilante force to well-trained shock troops that dominated Iran's offensive actions. Counterbalancing the infantry-heavy *Pasdaran*, the Regular Army provided limited tank, mechanized, and artillery support. Iran also had the *Baseej*, a largely untrained, but huge, paramilitary force that usually took the initial shock of the "human-wave" assaults.<sup>4</sup>

Most Iranian assaults were infantry-dominated, with limited tank and artillery support. If these assaults weren't planned well, they could be disastrous. But when the Iranians used infil-



tration tactics, tactical surprise, and properly controlled "human-wave" assaults, they were able to offset the superior weaponry of Iraq's army.<sup>5</sup>

Maintaining the initiative with an infantry-heavy army required huge manpower resources, and by the end of 1987, Iran was increasingly hard-pressed to meet that requirement. Huge casualty figures were disastrous for Iranian recruiting drives, and draft dodging was widespread. The army's morale and its willingness to sacrifice itself for such limited gains also sagged.

The Iranian army's effectiveness suffered from serious problems. The lack of modern weapons—tanks, artillery, and aircraft—was the most apparent. Logistic problems worsened a bad situation. With a Western arms embargo, much of Iran's Western equipment was deadlined due to a lack of spare parts. Turning to Korean and Chinese sources for weapons only aggravated the logistic nightmare.

But Iran's religious fanaticism was the greatest handicap for their army. Iran's religious leaders, the *mullahs*, had purged the military of most of its officers, destroying the professionalism the Shah had built. The *mullahs* further eroded the army's ability by constantly interfering in military decisions. Believing in a divine mandate, they often turned offensives into "mini-Jihads" that depended on religious fervor rather than careful planning and proper control.<sup>6</sup>

### **Iraq's Military System**

Since late 1980, the Iraqis had been on the strategic defensive. A lack of manpower made them unable to take the casualties inevitable in offensive war; and a lack of strategic depth made a static defense necessary. Based on the Soviet model, the army used its large arsenal of modern Soviet equipment to stop the massive Iranian offensives. After 1983, Iraq used chemical weapons to break the Iranian "human-wave" assaults. President Hussein maintained that Iraq could win the war on the defense. With the repeated defeats of their offensives, Iran would sooner or later seek peace.

But the Iranian seizure of the Faw Peninsula changed the situation. That victory was a blow to Hussein's prestige. Now it seemed that the defensive wasn't working. Iran had seized a sizable chunk of Iraqi territory, and worse, threatened Basra from the south as well as the east. Not only did this affect the Iraqi home front, but it forced Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who had been

financing the Iraqi war effort, to rethink their support. When the initial Iraqi counterattacks failed to budge the Iranians on the peninsula, Hussein was forced to rethink his defensive strategy.<sup>7</sup>

In reforging their army from a defensive shield to an offensive sword, the Iraqis had a number of advantages. Their army was relatively well-equipped and held considerable advantages in tanks (5-to-1), armored personnel carriers (4-to-1), and artillery pieces (4-to-1) over Iran's army. Its logistic system was based on the Soviet principle of "supply push"—a good system that Iraqi engineers implemented well.<sup>8</sup>

The Iraqis, however, faced two significant problems. First, their army wasn't particularly effective in combined arms operations. This was partly due to the rapid expansion of the army after 1984. By 1986, the Iraqi army had about 800,000 men; however, they weren't well-trained. Second, since 1981, the war had conditioned the Iraqi army for the defense. The men had become cautious and inflexible. This mind-set needed to be wiped out and replaced with an aggressive spirit. The Iraqis solved these two problems by strengthening the Republican Guards and implementing an intensive training program.

### ***"This training made major improvements in the Iraqi army and would prove critical to its victories in 1988."***

Honing the Republican Guards into an elite force was the first step toward an offensive machine. When the Faw Peninsula fell in 1986, there were only three Guard brigades; by 1988, there were at least 25. To fill these new brigades, Iraq turned to its one unused manpower resource: college students. Skillfully, Iraqi leadership convinced the students to enthusiastically volunteer for the Guards. These men would infuse a new aggressive spirit into the Iraqi army. Still, like the rest of the army, they were untrained.<sup>9</sup>

Iraq realized its army needed training. As early as 1984, it began to pull units out of the line during lulls in the action to train them as counterattack units. By 1987, the training took a more determined nature. Carefully selected infantry and armor units—including the Republi-

can Guards—trained in combined arms and maneuver operations. Artillery units trained in fire support for the maneuver units. The army also improved its tactical intelligence capabilities. Moreover, commanders were given more freedom in command. This training made major improvements in the Iraqi army and would prove critical to its victories in 1988.<sup>10</sup>

With its problems in training and spirit solved, the Iraqi army needed to hone its offensive skills in combat. The first objective was the Faw Peninsula.

### Preparation

The Iraqis needed an offensive victory. They carefully prepared for an attack against the Faw Peninsula. Planners poured over intelligence provided by the United States. They stockpiled artillery and chemical weapons and deployed ammunition stocks near the front. Assault forces staged several dress rehearsals for the attack over similar terrain in both winter and summer. The VII Corps received reinforcements, and the forces of the elite Republican Guards redeployed southwest of Basra.

All the while, Iraq gave Iran the impression that its concern was to the north. It staged deception operations on strategic and operational levels. President Hussein and his defense minister made highly publicized visits to the front in Kurdistan. And forces kept moving throughout the country, giving the impression they were deploying to the north.

Iraq's objective was to reoccupy the peninsula. To achieve this, Lieutenant General Maher Al-Rashid, commander of the attack, planned a two-prong, three-phase operation. From positions southwest of Basra, elements of the Republican Guards would attack southeast. Meanwhile, the VII Corps would attack along the west bank of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Each axis would break through, exploit, and then mop up. Rashid expected a 4- or 5-day operation with heavy casualties.<sup>11</sup>

### Area of Operations

The planned Iraqi attack would extend over much of the triangular Faw Peninsula. The strategic Shatt al-Arab waterway bordered the peninsula's eastern coast, while the Persian Gulf bordered its southern one. Offshore to the south was Kuwait's Bubiyan Island. On the peninsula's tip, the abandoned city of Al Faw stood at the end of the road from Basra.

The Faw battleground was flat and marshy with a number of lakes. The 30 square miles of peninsula were mostly marshland, ill-suited for anything but infantry combat. Only steep river banks and man-made defenses broke the flat terrain. During the rainy season between November and March, the ground became muddy and virtually impassible. After that, the ground was firmer and drier, but flooding could still make trafficability difficult. The weather was hot between May and September, with temperatures well over 100 degrees.

### Opposing Forces

The attacking Iraqis greatly outnumbered the defending Iranians. Moreover, the VII Corps and Republican Guards represented the best of Iraq's army. All told, the two corps-sized units had upward of 200,000 men; and they would be well supported by Iraqi aircraft and helicopters.<sup>12</sup>

The VII Corps was a battle-tested unit that had fought on the Basra front for at least two years. Its commander, Lieutenant General Rashid, was likewise experienced. He had successfully commanded corps against Iranian attacks since 1983, and had commanded VII Corps since 1986. After the fall of Faw in 1986, he urged taking offensive action. Flamboyant and influential, Rashid called himself "an experienced sword."<sup>13</sup>

In 1988, the Republican Guards had about 100,000 men organized into 25 brigades. They had their own independent artillery and helicopter support. The Guards were trained in armor, mechanized, and special forces offensive operations. They received the best equipment, including T-72 tanks, and enough trucks to support mobile action. Most of these units took part in the Faw operation. For this battle, Major General Iyad Khalifa Al-Rawi commanded the Guards.<sup>14</sup>

***"Iranian defenses were woefully inadequate, lacking depth and tank barriers."***

These formidable Iraqi forces faced an estimated 15,000 Iranian troops on the Faw Peninsula. Reduced from a peak strength of 30,000, the Iranians were supported with heavy artillery, but little armor. Although some were undoubtedly *Pasdaran* forces, the bulk were

lower-grade troops and had received little training for gas warfare. Furthermore, Iranian defenses were woefully inadequate, lacking depth and tank barriers.<sup>15</sup>

### **Operation "Blessed Ramadan"**

Under the code name of "Blessed Ramadan," Iraq launched its twin-pronged attack against its weak Iranian foe in the predawn hours of April 17, 1988. It was timed to hit the Iranians as they observed the start of Ramadan. After a short, 1-hour artillery barrage, the attack began. Starting from positions 10 miles north of Al Faw, Lieutenant General Rashid's corps pushed toward the city, with the corps infantry leading. As the corps moved through the palm groves parallel to the Shatt al-Arab, it faced heavy fire from both its front and the east, where Iranian artillery fired across the waterway.

The second prong, the Republican Guards, pushed southeast from its positions between Zubair and Umm Qasr. Under cover of darkness, special forces cut paths through the barbed wire and mine fields prior to the Guards attack. The Guards moved through the "Great Salt Lake," a tidal swamp west of Al Faw, often wading through chest-high water barriers.

To support the ground advance, the Iraqis flew unprecedented air missions. Fighter bombers and helicopters flew over 300 sorties. The helicopters were so effective that Iran claimed American involvement. Artillery support was also superb as it quickly moved forward.

Lieutenant General Rashid later said the real battle only lasted 6 hours before "the enemy collapsed." Flushed from their positions, the Iranians retreated in panic; Iranian commanders couldn't rally their troops. To maintain the pressure, some of the advancing Iraqis pushed south for 10 hours and didn't eat for 20. The VII Corps recaptured Al Faw, while the Republican Guards moved to the tip of the peninsula near Ras Al-Bishan.

By noon of April 18, the battle was over. Rashid's fears were not realized. The battle had lasted less than 36 hours. And, while both sides originally claimed inflicting heavy casualties on the other, casualties were relatively light. Iraq lost only a few hundred men. Most of these came in the initial movement through the Iranian mine fields and defensive barriers. The Iranians lost more, with most retreating across the Shatt. Reporters, visiting the front, counted about 200 Iranians as prisoners, and a few dozen bodies

along the main roads. Iraq captured most of Iran's weapons and equipment on the peninsula.

It's uncertain whether Iraq used chemical weapons in its attack; Iran immediately claimed that it did. However, many authorities agree with Iran's claims. Others point out that the huge Iraqi troop superiority made chemical weapons unnecessary.

One thing is certain: Iraq achieved almost complete surprise. Between 1980 and 1988, Iraq maintained a strategic defense and launched only a few big offensives. So when the Iraqi buildup began, Iran believed Iraq was strengthening its defenses of Basra. Tactically, the short artillery barrage and timing of the attack added to the Iranian surprise.<sup>16</sup>

### **The Battle's Significance**

For Iran, defeat on the Faw Peninsula humbled its revolutionary leaders; and they lost a valuable strategic position. No longer could they outflank Basra from the south. They were denied a pressure point against Kuwait, one of Iraq's financial supporters. Moreover, the defeat was disastrous for the already sinking Iranian morale.

On the other hand, Iraqi morale got a boost because the Faw victory gave them the largest territorial gains since 1980. More importantly, the operation marked the change from static defense to strategic offense. The Iraqi army proved itself capable of swift offensive actions, surprising some Western analysts. In the succeeding months, Iraq would use this new-found capability to launch a series of successful attacks against Iran. By July 1988, these attacks forced Iran to accept a cease-fire.

### **Lessons Learned**

Trying to find lessons from a battle that has so much incomplete or unclear data is a risky proposition at best. The fact that the Iraqi victory was so seemingly lopsided makes it even more complicated. But the Faw battle points to at least two lessons and gives some insight into the Iraqi army.

***"Iraq's victory shows the importance of deception and training in military operations."***



Given their overwhelming numbers, it's difficult to imagine the Iraqis not winning the battle. They could have shown poor planning, no tactical skill, bad coordination, and still bludgeoned their way to victory. It would seem, then, that the essential element of the Iraqi victory was sheer numbers.

Still, Iraq's victory shows the importance of deception and training in military operations. Strategic and operational deception helped Iraq obtain almost complete surprise. The deception operations, by focusing Iranian attention elsewhere, probably accounts for their weakened troop strength on the peninsula. The short artillery barrage and timing of the attack only added to the surprise. Together, these measures helped the Iraqis push the Iranians out of their positions.

Iraqi training helped keep casualties low. Their long-term training programs, especially the combined arms and maneuver training, increased army readiness. Specifically, the dress rehearsals over similar terrain and under similar conditions helped the VII Corps and Republican Guards prepare for the attack.

Aside from these two obvious "lessons," the Faw battle gives insights into the Iraqi army. First, the battle shows the Iraqis can be expert problem solvers. Faced with the dilemma of changing their army into an offensive weapon, they did an admirable job of mobilizing the students to reconstitute the Republican Guards. Then they trained the Guards and the rest of the army in offensive tactics and operations.

More importantly, an analysis of the battle offers insight into the purpose and use of the Republican Guards. First, they were created, trained, and equipped as an elite offensive spearhead. Second, the Faw battle established a pattern for the Guards' use. In the battle, Iraq paired the Guards with a Regular Army unit to gain a specific objective. In later offensives in 1988 and in Kuwait in 1990, they followed a similar pattern.

Military history can't predict the future. It can't guarantee what an enemy will do on the battlefield. It can, however, provide understanding—understanding of how events shaped an enemy and how an enemy shaped events. Herein lies its value for intelligence professionals.

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
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# IRAQ: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

By John B. Oakley

In July and August 1990, Iraq attained world prominence when it intimidated and then invaded its tiny neighbor Kuwait, thereby creating the crisis that led to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. During its 8-year war with Iran, Iraq borrowed as much as \$700 billion from Arab states. Iraq's debt to Kuwait alone was \$30 billion. Iraq's economy is based on oil, and the low price of crude, stabilized by OPEC at \$18 per barrel, upset the Iraqis. They wanted OPEC to raise the price to \$26. Each dollar increase in price per barrel equated to \$1 billion in income for Iraq.

Iraq accused Kuwait of exceeding its OPEC quota by 200,000 barrels per day, of artificially deflating the oil price, and of stealing Iraqi oil

from the Rumallah oil field. However, the real issue for Iraq was the offshore Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Iraq wanted Kuwait to give them these islands because they blocked Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf from their Umm Qasr naval base. Iraqi troops massed on the Kuwaiti border in an apparent attempt to intimidate the Kuwaitis. A few days later, Iraq made good on its threat and overran Kuwait in less than 12 hours.

This wasn't Iraq's first attempt to take over Kuwait. They had attempted incursions into Kuwait in 1961 and 1973 because of "historic claims." This was just the latest in a continuing series of conflicts between countries of Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa (the Middle East). These conflicts will undoubtedly continue; and our nation's political and military attention will

continue to be drawn to this area. To understand the roots of Middle East conflict one must look at the history of the area.


### Oppression and Conflict

Except for Kuwait, Middle East countries as we know them today didn't exist before World War I. Before that, the Ottoman Empire controlled all territories from Turkey through the Arabian Peninsula and across North Africa. The Ottoman Empire, founded in 1299, reached its zenith in the mid-16th Century when it besieged Vienna for 2 years. After failing to take Vienna, Ottoman fortunes declined, and by the 20th Century, the Empire had shrunk (See Map). The eastern part of the Empire consisted of three loosely governed provinces: Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. The Ottoman Turks had cruelly subjugated the Arab tribes since 1417 and were, therefore,

hated by the Arabs.

During World War I, the Turks allied themselves with the Germans. The British planned a campaign in the Middle East to protect their overland trade routes to India. However, they didn't have sufficient manpower, and they needed help against the Turks. Who might the British turn to for this help? The Arab tribes were the logical choice because of their hatred for the Turks.

In January 1915, Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner to Cairo, wrote a letter to Sharif (honorary title) Hussein of Mecca requesting Arab assistance against the Turks. Basically, McMahon promised the Arabs independence in exchange for their help in defeating the Turks. The Arabs agreed, and in June 1916 the Arab Revolt began. It was led by Captain T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) and Emir (prince



**THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE**

or commander) Feisal, son of Sharif Hussein. The Arabs and British swept the Turks out of the Middle East and the Arab army liberated the city of Damascus. This was the first major victory for the Arabs since they were subjugated by the Turks. This event, coupled with British promises of Arab independence, unleashed long suppressed Arab pride and created the beginnings of Arab nationalistic feelings.

The French became concerned about the successes of the Arab Revolt. They had been involved in the Levant Area (Syria and Lebanon) since the late 18th Century and were worried the British might make postwar concessions to the Arabs that would interfere with French interests. During 1916, British orientologist Sir Mark Sykes and Charles Georges Picot, French Consul in Beirut, negotiated secretly to clarify British and French post-World War I aims. They agreed that Britain and France would divide the Middle East into five zones, which would become either British or French protectorates (colonies).

### **A Jewish Homeland**

In 1896, the Zionist Manifesto, written in Russia, suggested that Jews should "restore the Jewish State." In the spring of 1917, Russia collapsed after the first Bolshevik Revolution, and Britain was concerned Russia would withdraw from the war. Leon Trotsky and other prominent Russians were Zionists, and Britain felt their support for a Jewish State would help the Allied cause by keeping Russia in the war.

In November 1917, British Foreign Secretary Sir Arthur Balfour, with President Wilson's backing, wrote a letter to Baron von Rothschild, a prominent Zionist and head of the Rothschild financial empire. This letter, known as the Balfour Declaration, stated: "His Majesty's Government favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." It also stated that the "Jews would not displace non-Jewish residents of Palestine, and Jews in other countries would not be displaced by non-Jews in those countries." Zionists interpreted the letter to mean Palestine was to be their homeland, while Arabs interpreted it to mean that Jews would live among them, but only as a minority in the Arab community.

### **Fruits of British Diplomacy**

Three conflicting pieces of British diplomacy laid the groundwork for the conflict we see in the Middle East today:

- In January 1915, the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence promised independence to the Arabs.

- In 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement promised Britain and France would divide the Middle East between them.

- In November 1917, the Balfour Declaration promised the Jews a homeland.

The British also told the Kurds, a Moslem warrior tribe of European origins who wanted independence, they would help seek the establishment of the State of Kurdistan in exchange for the Kurds' help in defeating the Turks. The Kurds are still fighting for independence in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey today.

At the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, Captain Lawrence and Emir Feisal spoke for Arab interests, but they were ignored because there were no concessions to be gained from the Arabs. At the San Remo Conference in April 1920, Britain agreed to honor the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Using a regional map and a pencil, British and French negotiators arbitrarily established boundaries and created Arab states with no regard for tribal, religious, ethnic, or linguistic differences. These states all became British or French mandates; again, the Arabs felt betrayed by the "European Colonialists." The Balfour Declaration was reaffirmed and Jewish immigration into Palestine began.

However, to appease the Arabs, the British established a quota system for Jewish immigration. As a result, no major immigration and upheaval occurred in the area. By the 1930's, Britain had retracted the quota system to appease Zionists in the United States and Britain, and Jewish immigration increased significantly. The Arabs saw their majority decrease sharply and they formed terrorist groups that attacked Jewish settlers. In self defense, Jewish settlers formed their own organizations and open warfare between Arabs and Jews became the norm. The groundwork was laid for the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.

These same post-World War I conferences also laid the groundwork for the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Emir Feisal was named military governor of Syria in 1918. However, France was concerned that Britain would ignore the Sykes-Picot Agreement, since Britain had trained and fought alongside the Arabs after promising them independence. But now, the British needed French assistance to attain their goals in Europe. So at the Versailles Conference, when Emir Feisal expected

to be granted his Syrian kingdom, Britain sold him out by making the Levant a French mandate.

### **Creation of Iraq**

At the San Remo Conference, British politicians artificially created a country: They used the eastern borders of the dismantled Ottoman Empire, added the region of Mosul and Kirkuk (because of its oil), and included the southwestern deserts (to connect with British Palestinian and Transjordan mandates). The Arabic name "*al-Iraq*," which originally designated only the southern region, was applied to the whole country. The British imported an Arabian prince (Emir Feisal) from Hijaz (now western Saudi Arabia) and made him King of Iraq. Feisal accepted the title, but in Arab eyes, Feisal sold out because the British controlled Iraq. There were anti-British outbursts and Feisal, a Sunni Moslem, was regarded as an "imported" prince by the Shiite majority (60 to 65 percent) in Iraq. However, since Feisal was a direct descendant of Mohammad the Prophet, the Shiites tolerated him.

Under the Ottomans, the eastern region was one of the most remote and least developed areas of the Empire, and there had been very little political development. The population was fragmented along religious, tribal, and ethnic lines. The problems created by these internal divisions overshadowed the developing national identity of Iraq. The Kurds were the largest single minority group in the region. The British had played upon Kurdish desires for independence to get their support against the Turks, and then ignored them after World War I. The Kurds saw King Feisal as a British pawn, and they initiated their first rebellion (1922-1924) shortly after Iraq was established. Their continuing search for autonomy created enormous internal security problems for the Iraqi government, continuing to the present government of Saddam Hussein.

### **Kuwait Established**

Drought and famine in the early 18th Century caused migration of Arab tribes to the area now known as Kuwait. These tribes established the town of Kuwait, and in 1754 elected the Sabah family to rule the area. This family has ruled the area ever since, although the territory was sometimes under the control of the Ottomans. Ottoman control ended with the secret British and Kuwaiti Treaty of 1899, which established

Kuwait's independence from the Ottoman Empire. Iraq was not created as a separate entity until 1920, which makes Iraq's "historic claims" to Kuwait seem rather ludicrous.

### **Iraqi Unrest**

On October 3, 1932, Iraq was given formal independence and admitted to the League of Nations. However, Britain still operated military bases in Iraq and British advisors influenced Iraqi officials. A modern school system had been established, Iraqis were gaining experience in affairs of state, and a modern military was being developed. King Feisal's death in 1933 coincided with renewed dissatisfaction and political unrest (between 1936 and 1941, there were seven attempted military coups). In the following years, national feelings developed more strongly.

In 1939, Feisal's 6-year-old grandson became King Feisal II. His relatives ran the government until 1953, when he became an adult. Prime Minister Nuri Said, a capable politician, controlled parliamentary affairs on behalf of the boy king. Said was perceived and hated by the Iraqi people as a British pawn. This hatred was suppressed until July 14, 1958, when the Iraqi army overthrew the monarchy in a bloody coup that wiped out the royal family. The newly formed Republic of Iraq quickly turned to a neutralist position in international relations.

Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim, leader of the coup, emerged as a dictator who was totally devoted to revolutionary reorganization of Iraq, with himself as supreme leader. In 1961, Qasim decided to expand Iraq's borders; he turned to Kuwait. The secret 1899 treaty between Kuwait and Britain had granted Kuwait British protection. This protectorate status ended June 19, 1961, when Britain granted independence to Kuwait. Qasim then declared that Kuwait was artificially created out of historic Iraqi territory under the Ottoman Empire, and he made military preparations to take Kuwait. Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League sent troops into Kuwait, backing down the Iraqis. This overtly hostile gesture isolated Iraq in the Arab world.

Qasim was politically inept, and although he suppressed opponents, he was finally killed in a coup led by Colonel Abd as-Salam Arif in February 1963. Arif's coup was supported by the Baath (resurgence) Socialist Party. After order was restored and Communist Party leaders were forced into exile, Arif banned the Baath Party.



Arif's new government faced tremendous challenges, the biggest of which was the Kurdish problem. Between 1961 and 1970 there were five major clashes between the Kurds and the Iraqi army. Another clash occurred in 1974; subsequently, the Kurds actively resisted the government throughout the Iran-Iraq War. The problem is still one of concern for the Iraqi government.

### Enter Saddam Hussein

Arif died in 1966 and his brother, Abd ar-Rahman Arif, took over. He was a weak leader and eventually was deposed by the Baath Party in a nearly bloodless coup on July 17, 1968. Major General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr became president of the Republic and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, which was organized to establish government policy. In 1973, Bakr claimed that two Kuwaiti islands actually belonged to Iraq, and Iraqi troops prepared to enforce this claim. However, both sides feared Iran might intervene and the situation was defused. Bakr was a figurehead president, the real strongman being Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, a civilian Baath Party member who had a background in conspiracy and violence. On July 16, 1979, Bakr retired because of poor health and Hussein became president. The following month, Hussein had 50 high level military and civilian officials executed for "conspiring against the country's higher interest," thereby establishing his method of dealing with opponents.

During the 1960's and 70's, the Ayatollah Mohammad al-Sadr became a charismatic Shiite leader among the Iraqi poor. The Baath government was secular and unsympathetic with Shiite religious fervor, while the Shiites resented their lack of voice in the government. This problem was an outgrowth of Iraqi politics which allowed no elections since overthrowing the monarchy in 1958; the government held power simply by using the army. By April 1980, Iran-Iraq border clashes had increased and Iranian religious leaders called on their Shiite Moslem brothers in Iraq to rise up against the Iraqi secular government. In late April, Hussein had Ayatollah al-Sadr and seven other Shiite clerics executed for leading a subversive organization. This created political problems for Hussein and probably influenced his decision to invade Iran in September 1980.

On September 22, 1980, President Hussein ordered Iraqi forces to invade Iran. Two of his goals were: First, Iraqi control of the long disputed Shatt al-Arab (Waterway of the Arabs); sec-


ond, the toppling of Ayatollah Khomeini. After initial Iraqi successes, the war stalemated for the next 6 years, and on July 18, 1988, a cease-fire ended the bloody war. Despite widespread disillusionment with the war and Iran's attempts to incite his Shiite population against him, Hussein maintained rigid control of Iraq. He was successful in building up his personality cult, and even Iraqis who disliked his regime, believed Iraq's security depended on his survival. Once the war ended, signs of opposition became apparent. In December 1988, a number of Iraqi army officers were executed for an apparent coup attempt. Hussein maintained control through a pervasive network of intelligence and security personnel that made Iraqis fearful of expressing their opinions. Hussein's main tools of law and order were torture and execution.

Looking at the historical background of the area, it's easy to understand why Arabs have a general distrust of Westerners. It's also easy to understand why the Iraqis accepted the repressive government of Saddam Hussein. For more than 400 years the entire region was suppressed by the Turks. Ever since achieving independence, Iraq has had one repressive regime after another. Repression has been the norm since 1417. The regime's security apparatus is everywhere and Iraqis have been afraid to express displeasure with the government. Since September 1990, anyone speaking out against the government may be executed on the spot. Hussein rules by fear and Iraqis have been very careful in speaking out against him. The repressive conditions are likely to remain long after Hussein is gone.

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## IRAQI SPONSORED TERRORISM: TARGET AMERICA?

By Karl A. Seger, Ph.D.

Within hours after Iraqi troops moved into Kuwait on August 2, 1990, what had been a sovereign nation was annexed as the 19th province of the aggressor. The terrorism that has been imposed on the Iraqi people for more than a decade was carried into the new "province." Confirmed reports of torture, mutilations, rape of women and young boys, summary executions, and other unimaginable horrors began flowing from the occupied country.

When confronted by an international community that demanded he remove his forces from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein elected to stand alone, stating that Kuwait no longer existed. He then attempted to link his cause with that of the Palestinians and with anti-imperialists around the world. He was successful; at a minimum, he won the support of the Palestinian people and many of their supporters. Within days, a number

of international terrorist groups moved their headquarters to Baghdad or opened offices there.

An alliance with terrorism is not new for Saddam Hussein. He has supported state directed and state sponsored terrorism since coming to power, and he has used terrorism internally to create one of the most oppressive regimes in the world.

Immediately after Saddam Hussein rose to power, he personally established an internal security system based on the Soviet KGB, but much more brutal. It is a system within which thousands of Iraqis are tortured and murdered. At one time, Saddam himself reportedly was one of the main torturers. His brutality was further demonstrated when he used chemical weapons against Iraq's Kurdish population and against Iran during the 8-year war. In an earlier incident with the Kurds, Hussein ordered the annihilation of the Kurdish village of Dakan in the province of Mosul. When he learned that 67 women and chil-

dren had survived the artillery shelling by hiding in a cave, Hussein ordered them to be burned alive (August 8, 1969). The cave became their grave.

Saddam Hussein was one of the first members of the Baath Party in Iraq. It professes to be a Pan-Arab party based on unity, freedom, and socialism. It is, in fact, a tool of oppression that has been brutal to its own people and aggressive toward its neighbors. As a minority party, the Baath Party had to seize control by force, and it continues to rule through a state of internal terrorism.

During the seventies and eighties, the West was concerned that nations sponsoring terrorism were sending their agents to assassinate targets in other countries. Libya received most of the blame for these actions. But Iraq was also targeting people for assassination. Iraq used its military intelligence apparatus to strike out at anti-Baath Iraqis in at least eight countries, including the United States. Between 1977 and 1983 there were four attacks in the Detroit area alone.

Iraq and the Baath Party have had connections with some of the world's most deadly terrorist leaders for decades. George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) first contacted Baath leader Michel Aflaq in 1951 and offered to "give the Baath the teeth." Abu Nidal, perhaps the most feared terrorist leader in the world today, was originally a member of the Baath party.

Between August 1990 and the start of DESERT STORM, leaders of various terrorist organizations, including the PLO's Yasser Arafat, George Habash of the PFLP, and Abu Abbas of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), proclaimed allegiance to Hussein. They vowed to support him in his struggle against the allied coalition and to use terrorism as a weapon against U.S. assets around the world. The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) also came to the aid of Iraq. Initially, these groups confined themselves to threats, but within 2 months the threats turned into action.

Vincent Cannistraro, a retired CIA official, reported that Iraq has established a network of terrorists around the world, waiting for orders to begin killing and bombing Arabs and Americans. He claimed they would first punish Arab countries who supported the U.S. and would then strike at Americans.

The first Iraqi sponsored terrorist attacks following the invasion of Kuwait were targeted against Egyptians. On October 12, 1990, Speaker

of the Egyptian Parliament Rifaat El Mahgoub, his driver, and four security guards died in a hail of machine gun fire. This was carried out by Islamic fundamentalists, but ANO is also suspected of involvement.

Several days before El Mahgoub's assassination, a bomb was found in a subway station behind the Nile Hilton. (The assassination took place in front of the station behind the Nile Hilton.) Terrorists placed the device in an oil can and timed it to go off at the rush hour to maximize casualties. The police were able to defuse it.

In another incident during October, Syrian soldiers stopped four ANO agents near Beirut. The agents opened fire and three were killed immediately, while the fourth was wounded. The soldiers found a bomb rigged with explosives in the agents' car. After interrogating the wounded terrorist, the soldiers tied him inside the car, placed the other bodies inside, and detonated the explosives.

### Groups and Tactics

Here's a brief summary of some terrorist groups reportedly working with Saddam Hussein. Pay particular attention to the tactics used by each group since a good predictor of future behavior is past behavior.

The **Abu Nidal Organization** was founded in 1974. Its headquarters is in Baghdad and it has about 500 members operating all over the world. Sabri Khalil al-Banna (Abu Nidal) is ANO's leader.

Arguably the most dangerous terrorist group in the world, ANO was formed after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war in response to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's decision to limit terrorist actions to attacks on Israeli targets. Nidal believes in no such restrictions. The rift between Nidal and Arafat was so strong that they issued death threats against each other.

Abu Nidal was once a member of the Baath Party, and Iraq was ANO's first state sponsor. ANO then moved to Libya and Syria, but returned to Iraq in 1990. The group is economically sound and has an infrastructure throughout the Middle East, Europe, and reportedly within the United States.

Nidal has no love for Kuwait or other moderate Arab states. Several years ago Kuwait refused to pay a \$10 million tribute (blackmail) demanded by the group. ANO responded by placing a bomb on a Kuwaiti commercial jet, killing all 112 people on board. Kuwait then paid a trib-



ute of \$12 million to avoid further aircraft bombings.

ANO's tactics include assaults with automatic weapons and grenades. But they also use car bombs and have been known, as in the Kuwaiti incident, to place bombs on aircraft. ANO has suicide terrorists within its ranks.

The **Palestine Liberation Front**, founded in 1977, has 300 members. Headquartered in Baghdad, the PLF operates throughout the Middle East and Europe. Muhammed Abu al Abbas is its leader.

The PLF was originally part of the PFLP-General Command (GC), but split off when the PFLP-GC supported the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in June 1976. Iraq helped establish this group, which obtained seats on the Palestinian National Council in 1981. Abu Abbas has always had close ties with Iraq; in the past, this has caused some dissension within the group. He also had close ties with the PLO, but reportedly severed those in 1988 when the PLO denounced the use of terrorist tactics.

Abbas likes to use spectacular tactics. His terrorists have struck at Israel using boats from the sea, and hang gliders or hot air balloons from the air. They specialize in hostage taking, but are not skilled in the use of bombs.

The **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** was founded in 1967. Its headquarters is in Syria, with an office in Baghdad. Its present membership is about 1,000. PFLP leader is Dr. George Habash, and its area of operations is Europe and the Middle East.

When the PFLP decided in 1968 to take the Palestinian struggle beyond the Middle East, it began to hijack aircraft in Europe. The PFLP is one of the world's most experienced terrorist groups, and Habash is one of the most effective terrorist leaders. As mentioned earlier, Habash first approached the Baath Party in Iraq in 1951, offering to form a military force for them. Following that contact, he was influential in several different Palestinian organizations until forming the PFLP.

The PFLP has a strong financial base and an infrastructure throughout the Middle East, Europe, and possibly the United States. This group has operated with the Japanese Red Army (JRA). In fact, a JRA member was arrested in New Jersey 2 years ago while en route to bomb a U.S. military facility in New York City. The bomber is now serving a 30-year sentence.

This group uses rather eclectic tactics. They

have hijacked aircraft, attacked unarmed civilians with machine guns and hand grenades, and bombed a variety of targets.

The **May 15 Organization** was founded in 1979 and has 50 to 60 members. Headquartered in Baghdad, it operates in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. Its leader is Husayn al-Umari, also known as Abu Ibrahim.

Abu Ibrahim is known as "the bomb man." During the early 1980's, this group was responsible for bombings in London, Rome, Istanbul, Athens, and Vienna. Anti-U.S. attacks include the August 1982 bombing of a Pan American airliner en route from Tokyo to Honolulu and the attempted bombing of a Pan American airliner in Rio de Janeiro in August 1981. It hasn't been active since 1985 when key members decided to join the Special Operations Group of Fatah. Ibrahim may now be working directly for Saddam Hussein.

This group was known for its innovative bombings. Ibrahim designed hidden compartments in suitcases to carry bombs, in addition to developing smaller, more clever devices. He now may be developing special bombs for use by Saddam's agents around the world.

The **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine** was founded in 1969 and has about 500 members. Headquartered in Baghdad, it operates in the Middle East. Naif Hawatmeh is the leader.

In May 1974, members took hostages in a schoolhouse at Ma'alot, Israel. They murdered 27 civilians and wounded another 134, mostly children.

This group depended on Syria for its survival during most of the seventies. However, they refused to join the Syrian-created Palestine National Liberation Front, causing a break in the alliance. The group is Marxist-Leninist, and members believe the Palestinian national goal can only be achieved through a revolution of the working class.

Other than the Ma'alot incident, this group usually engages in bombings and grenade attacks, directed at Israeli targets.

The **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command** was founded in 1968 and has about 500 members. Their headquarters is believed to be in Syria. Headed by Ahmad Jibril, the PFLP-GC operates in the Middle East and Europe.

Syria and Libya have sponsored this group. It also has had ties to Iran and reportedly, under



contract to that country, planned the Pan American Flight 103 bombing.

Iraq reportedly contacted Jibril and invited him to open an office in Baghdad. Although he initially declined, he may have since received the go-ahead from his patron state Iran. Jibril's group is best known for the Pan American bombing but the group has also been responsible for armed attacks, hijackings, and other smaller bombings.

**Force 17** was founded in 1970 and its present strength is unknown. It operates internationally, with headquarters in Baghdad.

This is Yasser Arafat's personal security force. It has committed several terrorist acts including the killing of three Israelis on Cyprus in 1985. Their support comes directly from the PLO, and their headquarters is collocated with PLO headquarters. To demonstrate his commitment to Iraq during the recent crisis, Arafat sent elements of Force 17, led by Abu Iyad, to Baghdad. Iyad was a top level PLO member. He reportedly headed Black September, the terrorist organization that captured the world's attention during the 1972 Munich Olympics. However, it is believed that Iyad didn't share Arafat's support for the Iraqi cause. On January 15, 1991, he and two other PLO leaders were assassinated in Tunisia by a bodyguard who happened to be a member of the Abu Nidal Organization.

Force 17 is designed as a fighting force. Their limited terrorist activities have only involved attacks on civilians. They would need outside help if they were to employ bombs.

**Hizballah (Islamic Jihad)** was founded in 1983 and its strength is unknown. Headquartered in Lebanon, it operates in the Middle East and Europe. Its leader is Muhammad Husayn Fadallah.

That the Shi'a Hizballah would come to the aid of the Baath Party in Iraq demonstrates the bizarre nature of politics in the Middle East. Hizballah is a political, religious, and military organization aligned with Iran but composed of the Shi'a of Lebanon. Their spiritual leader, Sheikh Fadallah, is even more of an Islamic fundamentalist than was the Ayatollah Khomeini, and has a bitter hatred of the United States.

Husayn Musawi, one of the principal leaders, directs Hizballah's activities from Baghdad. Musawi was reportedly behind the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. He also has directed suicide bombing attacks and car bombings.

The group's activities aren't limited to bombings. They also assassinate, kidnap, and hijack aircraft. They have attacked U.S. interests throughout the Middle East and Europe. This group is every bit as ruthless as the ANO.

### Other Concerns

Many groups now tied to Iraq have the infrastructure to strike at targets throughout the Middle East and Europe. Some of that infrastructure was lost with the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block, but Iraq's intelligence system can help compensate for those losses. Iraq's Military Intelligence Department, or Istikhbarat, operates with the General Intelligence Department, or Mukhabarat, to provide intelligence and to direct terrorist operations around the world. Members have committed terrorist acts in Lebanon, Sweden, England, Egypt, Sudan, France, Belgium, and the United States.

In addition to state sponsored terrorism, we must concern ourselves with Iraqi sympathizers around the world. Some free-lance agents have become loose cannons, striking at Western and Arab targets even when it's not in Iraq's best interests.

We must also be concerned about another category of terrorist in the United States—white supremacists. A decade ago, the Iranian revolution resulted in a backlash in this country among right-wing groups. David Duke, head of a major Klan faction, marched across cities in the South demanding that Iranians go home. The confrontation with Iran provided an additional rallying cry for the anti-Soviet, anti-Israeli, white supremacist organizations.

Right-wing white supremacy is alive and well in the United States today. White supremacists are looking for a new cause; the decline of the Soviet Union has left them with a void in their "reason for being." Let's hope an anti-Arab stance does not replace it. One only has to look at the history of the Ku Klux Klan, the Posse Comitatus, or the Brotherhood of Silence to see the threat this type of group represents. If anti-Iraq or anti-Arab sentiments continue to increase in the United States, these groups will see their membership increase as well.

### The First Thirty Days

The world's most effective terrorist leaders have threatened to commit attacks against the United States and its allies. But let's examine the

reality of what has occurred during the Gulf War.

The number of terrorist incidents has increased dramatically. Before January 15, 1991, an average of one incident a day was reported by the major news services. Between January 15 and February 15, the average number of reported incidents increased to four a day.

A summary of 145 incidents reported between January 1 and February 15, 1991, shows United States interests were targeted in 35 percent of all cases. Other countries in the coalition were targeted in 34 percent of the incidents. The remaining incidents involved participants in ongoing conflicts and insurgencies, such as the Sikhs in the Punjab and the narco-terrorists in Colombia.

Of these incidents, 63 percent were bombings or arson, including attempted bombings; 11 percent were assassinations; 19 percent were attacks and ambushes; and the other 19 percent were a variety of tactics ranging from vandalism to kidnapping.

Countries hit hardest by the increase in terrorism over the last several months are Turkey (20 incidents), Greece (13), Peru (11), and Lebanon (10). By February 15, there were 10 low-level terrorist related actions or attempts within the United States. These included several anti-Arab arson attacks.

With several important exceptions, most of Saddam Hussein's terrorists have been the loose cannon type, not the state supported type. An Iraqi diplomat attempted to direct an attack against U.S. interests in the Philippines on January 19, 1991. The bomb exploded while the two terrorists were on their way to the U.S. Information Library, killing one terrorist and injuring the other. The diplomat behind the incident was expelled, as have been many Iraqi diplomats at other posts around the world. Since Iraq had planned to use these diplomats (in reality, intelligence case officers) to direct its state directed terrorism, this threat has been greatly diminished.

Iraq initially focused its state sponsored terrorism toward Egypt. At least 17 pro-Iraqi terrorists, representing eight different groups, have been arrested there since the war began. These include four Iraqis, two Jordanians, and a Tunisian, with the remainder belonging to the ANO and Islamic Jihad. Iraq directed these terrorists to work together to assassinate Egyptian officials and to create tension along the Egyptian-Israeli border. Undoubtedly, they have dispatched other teams to other countries.

Another interesting terrorist connection goes

from Iraq to Cuba to the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru. Supported by Cuba, this group was formed in 1983. Since January 16, the MRTA has increased its activity against U.S. interests and the Peruvian government. Cuba has been aligned with Saddam Hussein since at least 1980 and has been accused of violating U.N. trade sanctions against Iraq. Cuba claims it continues to provide food and medical supplies as part of a humanitarian effort but said it canceled contracts for 382 tons of sisal rope, 140,000 meters of fabric, and 680 cases of rum and other spirits. Why an Islamic country needed 680 cases of liquor was not explained. Cuba continues to maintain a 250-person medical brigade in Iraq.

Terrorism related to the recent war with Iraq will continue long after the war's end. Islamic fundamentalists, Pan-Arab zealots, Palestinian groups, and anti-American groups and individuals will continue to target U.S. interests. If Saddam Hussein survives, he will use terrorism to "get even" for his humiliating defeat. Even if he dies, he will be considered a martyr and his memory will inspire these people to action.

The greatest threat still comes from state sponsored groups aligned with Iraq. Although they have not been responsible for a major action against the United States since January 1, they have the capability to create a major incident that would result in substantial loss of life. And they can strike anywhere in the world.

The war against Saddam Hussein's terrorism will last a lot longer than the war against his aggression in Kuwait did. American interests, whether they be military, diplomatic, or other government interests, will be targeted. The United States has entered a new era, an era that requires us to remain vigilant and on guard against terrorism at home and, especially, abroad.

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## Verification Under START: The Need for Equality

called *Maskirovka*, which hinders U.S. foreknowledge of test details. Furthermore, the United States seldom objects to Soviet telemetry encryption, even though we don't encrypt ours, or to the periodic jamming of U.S. technical verification means, although the Agreement and the Treaty restrict both actions. In contrast, details of U.S. tests are both easy to predict or to find out about ahead of time.

On the surface, it appears the United States is being had. However, the issue isn't that simple. It is complicated by ambiguities in the Agreement and the Treaty, historical differences on both sides in attitudes towards openness, deterrence, and compliance; and, finally, by the cost/benefit trade-off for our government when considering whether to encrypt telemetry and improve OPSEC. As our government moves to ratify a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and to develop a strategic defense system, it must reexamine its tolerance of these inequities or face even greater disadvantages. This article examines the issues of past strategic missile testing practices, the inequality of past U.S. and Soviet testing in regard to protection of key information, the confusion in past agreements about data denial, and the need to incorporate equal access to such data in future agreements like START.

By Lieutenant Colonel John G. Howe

Although the political and military climate in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is changing, super powers continue to develop new warheads, boosters, and penetration aids to modernize strategic arsenals. To deal with the nuclear arms issue, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the Interim Agreement (SALT I) and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). These documents require the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct their ICBM and SLBM tests openly. Theoretically, each side can now verify the other's compliance with the Agreement and the Treaty. Unfortunately, each side works under different concepts of openness, and the language of the documents is not specific. This has resulted in a disadvantage to the United States in getting the information it needs to verify Soviet compliance.

The obstacles to our getting information are twofold: The Soviets encrypt their ICBM telemetry; and they conduct a comprehensive OPSEC program, as part of a broader security program

### National Technical Means

Each nation verifies Treaty compliance by using "national technical means" (NTM). While not defined in either SALT I or SALT II, both parties understand NTM to mean intelligence resources. The wording used to describe the role of NTM is almost the same in both documents:

"For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement (SALT I version), each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law."

Presumably, NTM of verification include imagery satellites, radar, optical instruments, and other intelligence collection resources.<sup>1</sup> The United States has been deliberately vague in



defining NTM to avoid limiting its intelligence collection options and to prevent the Soviets from trying to negotiate NTM from a quid pro quo position. However, the amount of intelligence data each nation can collect is by no means equal; the United States and the Soviet Union have different perspectives on security and on interpretation of portions of the Treaty. In contrast to what the Soviets can obtain, the United States lacks complete information on Soviet strategic missile development and testing.

### U.S. and Soviet Intelligence Collection

Some of the most significant gaps in U.S. monitoring and verification occur during the testing phase of a Soviet missile; imagery alone can provide little critical information during this phase. The United States must use other resources, which are often hindered by a dependence on tip-off, complicated agreements with third party countries, risky deployments of expensive assets, and possible loss of data due to Soviet OPSEC measures.<sup>2</sup> Whether or not these intelligence systems can accomplish U.S. verification goals has spurred major debate within the arms control and intelligence communities. Use of on-site inspections and NTM is likely to be a dominant issue in negotiating START. However, on-site inspections won't reveal performance data that is potentially available to NTM during research and development tests and subsequent operational tests.

### Soviet Maskirovka

*Maskirovka* has elements of OPSEC, denial, and deception. As part of this program, the Soviets encrypt signals information containing key strategic missile performance data.<sup>3</sup> *Maskirovka* is especially critical during research and development and the subsequent field testing of a strategic missile. Once the missiles are deployed, the United States can determine by imagery the number of silos being built, state of construction, etc. The Soviets use *Maskirovka* in a very elaborate fashion to deny the United States tip-off information on the time, nature, and target area of a test, as well as the performance data.

In contrast, the Soviets know the United States will conduct its strategic tests at either the Eastern Test Range (ETR) for most U.S. and United Kingdom SLBMs, or the Western Test Range (WTR) for U.S. Air Force ICBMs. Recently, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) used both ranges during a single experi-

ment and will probably continue to do so.<sup>4</sup> Most strategic missile tests take place over open ocean areas, with reentry vehicle impact near Ascension Island for ETR tests and the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands for WTR tests. Information about the dates and exact nature of missile tests at both ranges is classified. However, the Soviets probably monitor range and contractor communications and learn enough information to deploy assets like intelligence collection ships. These platforms then get enough data to interpret the performance of most of the Free World's nuclear missiles. At times, the Soviets have deployed these ships at both launch points and impact areas.<sup>5</sup>

### Telemetry and Encryption

Arguably, the most valuable data on a nuclear missile during developmental or operational testing (other than a copy of the test report) is the telemetry. Telemetry is performance information relayed back to earth stations from the missile while in flight. In any telemetric signal, there's a multitude of information that quantifies the performance of many ballistic missile subelements. This data is used to determine critical items of concern in arms verification—throw weight, number of warheads, burn time, etc. Analysts use this data not just for verification but also to comprehensively understand the missile system's performance. Nations use this data to develop countermeasures, such as those the SDIO is developing. The SALT II Treaty, in its Second Common Understanding under Article XV, clearly prohibits one nation denying telemetric information to the other:

"Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty."

The wording of this Common Understanding appears to contradict other sections of the Treaty. Paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty states:

- "Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article."

- "Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate (emphasis added) concealment measures



which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices."

Encryption appears to be the ultimate in deliberate concealment measures, at least when it hides critical aspects of missile performance and capabilities. Both parties agreed that encryption can only be used when it would not impede Treaty verification.

The problem is neither that the Interim Agreement nor the Treaty define the exact data that can be encrypted without impeding verification. Much of this data, if revealed to the other country, might disclose capabilities without actually aiding in verification. The Second Common Understanding also allows each country to judge the degree to which its own encryption practices impede monitoring and verification by the other's NTM.

Two elements of missile performance data that both sides seem to agree are critical to both the Interim Agreement and the Treaty are the number of warheads the MIRV bus can carry (limited to 10 for the ICBMs and 14 for SLBMs) and the throw weight (the combined weight of the warheads, the warhead decoys, chaff, and the mechanisms that aim and release them). Although it's easy to monitor the number of warheads carried on a particular missile being tested, verification of a missile's throw weight depends on accurate evaluation of the performance data which may be encrypted, such as rate of fuel flow and engine thrust.<sup>6</sup>

### U.S. Quandary and Response

U.S. response has been mixed. Some in Congress have proposed we withdraw from the Treaty if the United States—

- Detects encryption.
- Thinks the encrypted data pertains to a Treaty area.
- Protests to the Standing Consultative Commission with a demand that the information be reevaluated, and the Soviets refuse.

For now, the intelligence community continues to perform its task with the data it now gets, without acknowledging the success of Soviet encryption practices. The U.S. intelligence community may not want to reveal difficulties in deciphering the encrypted telemetry; that kind of revelation tells the adversary their OPSEC program is denying at least some information need-

ed to assess a weapon system's performance. Instead, we tolerate continued Soviet capitalization on the encryption loophole, spend more money to monitor and verify, and hope our analysts are able to correctly assess the capabilities of Soviet missiles.

### Soviet Actions

The Soviets continue to take advantage of the ambiguities in the Common Understanding and U.S. reluctance to respond either by protesting or by starting a massive encryption program of its own. Since the SALT I Interim Agreement in 1972, telemetry encryption has increased, along with reported jamming of U.S. assets monitoring missile performance data. In February 1984, *Washington Post* reporters Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported the Soviets were not only encrypting telemetry, but were also jamming Cobra Dane, the phased array radar in the Aleutians and the primary source of post-boost phase data on Soviet missiles at that time.<sup>7</sup> A month before that column appeared, President Reagan delivered to Congress a report entitled "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements." This report outlined many Soviet violations or suspected violations of SALT I and II. Quoting from the report:

"The SALT I Agreements and the exchange of commitments made concerning SALT II bind the United States and the Soviet Union not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification, by national technical means, of compliance with provisions of those agreements. However, during the decade of the 1970's, there has been a substantial increase in Soviet arms control-related concealment activities that clearly impede U.S. verification efforts. An example of Soviet concealment activities is the encryption of the SS-X-25 missile telemetry, which impedes U.S. ability to determine the characteristics of this missile, including characteristics controlled by SALT II."<sup>8</sup>

### Conclusion

It's evident the Soviets have violated at least the spirit if not the letter of the Agreement and the Treaty. The United States seldom practices telemetry encryption and releases enough information in open literature to allow rapid correlation with monitored data. This makes it easy for the Soviets to verify our compliance. Significant and costly U.S. assets are not able to verify Soviet compliance due to an effective *Maskirovka* pro-

gram. The Soviets can afford to violate the spirit of Treaty because of three factors:

1. The lack of an aggressive U.S. response to Soviet OPSEC practices. The United States does not have the intent nor the available assets to jam Soviet NTM. An encryption program would increase the defense budget and have a potentially negative impact on our strategic missile community's ability to collect and analyze our own performance data.

2. An attitude that we have the "moral high ground." We deliberately use candor when conducting ICBM or SLBM tests so the Soviets can collect data. This data not only verifies U.S. compliance, but reveals to the Soviets that our systems are extremely accurate and deadly, thereby affirming deterrence.

3. Confusion, either deliberate or accidental, over the definition of "deliberate concealment" and over what telemetered performance data we can legally encrypt. There does not exist, either in the Interim Agreement or the Treaty, a definition of the specific categories of information that can be encrypted. The U.S. strategic missile community needs a clear definition so this confusion is eliminated.

Arms control experts argue over the degree to which the United States currently is capable of adequately verifying Soviet compliance, and the extent that Soviet OPSEC practices have interfered with our verification efforts. One trend of thought holds that Soviet denial of performance data is not important in the "big picture" and that the United States could still detect any large-scale or "break-out" cheating. While this may be true, this philosophy gives the Soviets an advantage. It denies the United States the ability to gather reliable and complete intelligence data which we can verify and upon which we can build an effective defensive system, such as SDI.

### Future Actions

Recently, we've tried to upgrade security at both the ETR and the WTR. However, these security improvements have affected only the ranges themselves and not the missiles tested there. We need to couple upgrades in range OPSEC practices with corresponding missile system security improvements, such as secured telemetry which users (military services) control. The Departments of State and Defense need to agree that Soviet OPSEC practices may be denying the United States significant data we need to verify compliance with the Treaty and to develop a

strategic defense.

In the meantime, as a deterrent we should develop encryption systems for strategic missiles; this is especially important if we develop Midgetman or make major improvements to a currently fielded strategic missile. We should use these systems on a quid pro quo basis along with other OPSEC measures to deny the Soviets as much data as possible.

Current strategic arms reduction negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should include an explicit understanding that future encryption will not be permitted under any circumstances. This action would be in consonance with the intrusive nature of any on-site inspection program; and, given the reluctance with which a U.S. encryption program would probably be received by U.S. strategic missile developers, would at least allow the arms control and intelligence communities equal access to Soviet performance data. Equal access to each side's performance data would allow OPSEC resources to be dedicated to other DOD programs, such as the control of Soviet movements under an on-site inspection program resulting from START or from successful completion of an "Open Lands" or "Open Skies" agreement.

### End Notes

1. John A. Adam and Stephen M. Meyer, "Verification Peacekeeping by Technical Means," *IEEE Spectrum Magazine*, July 1986, pp. 42-69.
2. James T. Reitz, *Lexicon of Selected Soviet Terms Relating to Maskirovka (Deception)* (Washington, D.C.: DIA, October 1983), p. 2.
3. Glen Zorpette, "Monitoring the Tests," *IEEE Spectrum Magazine*, July 1986, pp. 57-66.
4. Craig Covault, "SDI Delta Space Experiment to Aid Kill-Vehicle Design," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, September 15, 1986, pp. 18-19.
5. Meyer.
6. Ibid.
7. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Keeping Quiet about Soviet Cheating," *Washington Post*, Washington, D.C., February 24, 1984.
8. General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, "A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983," Washington, D.C., October 1984, p. 9.

*Lieutenant Colonel John G. Howe is currently assigned to the OPSEC Directorate, NSA, as an analyst. He has more than 10 years experience in OPSEC and threat analysis, related to a number of DOD programs. LTC Howe participated as a team chief or analyst in several OPSEC surveys of test ranges, including the Eastern and Western Test Ranges.*

# LEADERSHIP NOTES

## MURPHY'S LAWS OF COMBAT: A MESSAGE FOR YOUNG LEADERS

By Colonel Jay E. Vaughn

*Taken from remarks made to a graduating MIOBC Class.*

I'd like to share some thoughts with you on how to succeed as a junior officer in Military Intelligence. I can certainly relate to the thoughts and feelings of anticipation, apprehension, and impatience you may feel as you start your career. Like you, I entered the Army in a year a war started. In 1965, I was in a hurry to get to Vietnam before that war ended so I could help win it. In my case, things did not turn out as I anticipated.

In DESERT STORM, on the other hand, the shooting ended almost as soon as it had started. Nevertheless, a lasting peace in the Persian Gulf is still a long way off; in the end, this war and its aftermath will have touched each of us. Quite possibly, at some point in your career, you may have to face combat in that region or in some other "hot spot" in the world. If so, you'll need to use everything you've learned to do your job and to persevere.

As you begin your Army career, I ask you to remember Murphy's Laws of Combat, and to consider three watchwords that have been the success formula for many who have gone before you: Enthusiasm, experience, and leadership.

### Enthusiasm

First, a few words about enthusiasm: Do **something**, even if it's wrong. I'll let you in on a secret: Unless they're catastrophic, mistakes by lieutenants are almost always offset by enthusiasm! When you arrive at your first Army assignment, you're not expected to know everything; but you are expected to be eager and enthusiastic about learning and gaining experience.

But Murphy cautions against over-enthusiasm: Remember, "incoming fire has the right of way." Also, "never share a foxhole with someone braver than yourself!"

Enthusiasm is the first quality your battalion

and company commanders will look for in you as a platoon leader. They'll expect you to make mistakes as a lieutenant; just don't make them on purpose. And make them by trying to do the right thing, not by failing to do anything.

Be enthusiastic about your soldiers. If you are, you'll soon be leading the best soldiers in the best Army we've ever had. Your enthusiasm for these young men and women will be contagious.

What do these soldiers want from you? Perhaps Ralph Waldo Emerson described it best when he said, "What each of us wants in our leaders is someone who will make us do what we can." That kind of leadership requires you to be more than just a good cheerleader; but if you become an enthusiastic cheerleader and give your soldiers the opportunity to succeed, I can guarantee you'll be a winner too.

Be enthusiastic about your unit and its mission. Decide, going in, that you will succeed by helping your boss succeed. Become of the unit "spark plug," that person who sees what should be done, and then, makes it happen. What you and your soldiers accomplish is critically important to our nation. Unlike many people, you'll be able to look back at the end of each day and honestly say, "I've done my best in an important job."

Vince Lombardi once said, "The quality of a person's life is in direct proportion to their (sic) commitment to excellence, regardless of their chosen profession." Whether you serve your country for one tour or for over 20 years, be enthusiastic about what you're doing, because it is important. There are no unimportant jobs in the Army. Being a soldier is important to the future of our country and our way of life. Because of the media coverage of the action and subsequent victory in Operation DESERT STORM, the entire nation has learned to appreciate the importance of a well-trained military. People now know the work we MI professionals do is absolutely critical. As an MI soldier and leader, you'll continuously be challenged to use your intellect to solve tactical



or strategic intelligence problems. You should never be bored.

### **Experience**

Next, some thoughts about experience. According to Murphy's Laws of Combat, experience teaches that "the enemy invariably attacks on two occasions: When you're ready for them, and when you're not ready for them." Our job in MI is to make sure the Army is always ready. This requires experience.

Our branch demands much of its officers and NCOs in both knowledge and experience. Later on, you'll be selected or not selected for key positions, promotions, and schools based on your demonstrated branch qualifications, as evidenced by your successful experiences. Your commander as well as promotion and selection boards will assess your qualifications based on the jobs you've had and your performance in those jobs. You'll succeed if you're willing to compete fiercely for those jobs that can give you a sound base of tactical intelligence experience.

Experience will help make you a genius in the eyes of your soldiers and your boss. As Thomas Edison said, "Genius is one percent inspiration and 99 percent perspiration."

You'll acquire key experiences only by actually doing the work, not by simply reading about it. Here are the kinds of jobs that will give you branch qualification:

- Tactical leadership jobs teach you to soldier, to survive, and to accomplish things through MI soldiers in military organizations.
- Staff officer jobs help you perfect your writing and public speaking skills. Conduct briefings as often as you can to gain confidence when addressing groups of senior officers.
- Battalion S2 jobs put you in close contact with Army tactical decision makers so you can "walk in their moccasins" and learn how they think, make operational decisions, and use intelligence.
- Intelligence production jobs sharpen your analytical skills and force you to know threat doctrine, organization, equipment, and capabilities inside and out.
- Collection management jobs require you to fully understand tactical and strategic intelligence collection, processing, and communications systems.

It will take your entire career to become a complete MI officer. Your first experiences are as vital to your development as any you'll have later

on. They will assuredly increase your competence and value to the Army and the country. Incidentally, promotions and additional responsibilities are not a matter of luck; unless you define luck as what happens when preparation meets opportunity. So compete vigorously for the most important MI jobs, like platoon leader and maneuver battalion S2. These types of jobs will give you sound tactical intelligence experience.

### **Leadership**

The third watchword to remember is leadership. Leadership skills are to an Army officer what surgery techniques are to a neurosurgeon. Some say that what makes a military officer's profession unique is that he or she manages violence. For MI officers, our profession demands even more than that. While it's true we train for and focus on leading MI soldiers under situations of extreme stress during wartime, we must also perform vitally important intelligence collection, production, and collection management functions in peacetime and other situations short of war.

We have just seen a war in Southwest Asia. It was literally "show time" for some of you. But, in peace or war, the most important thing you'll do as an MI officer is to lead soldiers.

You began your pursuit to learn leadership years ago. Otherwise you wouldn't be a lieutenant today. This pursuit will last a lifetime. You have probably already learned that good leaders are not born that way. They have worked hard to develop their leadership skills. You've already learned that the essence of leadership is learning how to deal with people.

I've known many superb leaders in my Army experience—some were junior officers, many were NCOs. What these outstanding leaders had in common, besides strength of character, was a driving desire to learn more about leadership in order to sharpen their leadership skills.

You'll probably notice that the good leaders you encounter have their priorities in order and are able to focus on the soldiers they serve. You'll also notice that these good leaders continually build teamwork, while showing respect for the uniqueness of each person. Incidentally, Murphy's Laws of Combat agree that teamwork is essential: "It gives them someone else to shoot at."

Team building and effective person-to-person relationships boil down to the ability to communicate three things to another person: Kindness, encouragement, and challenge.



Kindness means showing you understand your soldiers' situations and needs. Encouragement is your positive reinforcement of their endeavors. Encourage others to do and to be their best, in a genuine positive manner; and watch them do almost anything to live up to your expectations. Challenge means setting achievable goals that cause your soldiers to grow. Challenge them as individuals to do better; and make these challenges fit the larger needs of your unit.

What do your soldiers want you to be for them? Again, Emerson said it best, "What each of us wants in our leaders is someone who will make us do what we can."

That is your role as a leader—to forget yourself, and to serve soldiers. Be the person who, through kindness, encouragement, and challenge, stimulates soldiers to "be all we can be," as the slogan goes. Murphy's Laws of Combat agree: "Try to look unimportant, they may be low on

ammunition"

I predict that what you'll discover, if you focus on the soldiers and remember the three watchwords of **enthusiasm, experience, and leadership**, is that you'll not only enjoy your job and your MI career, but you'll succeed beyond your wildest expectations. The simple truth is that through your encouragement and leadership, the fine soldiers we have in the Army today will make you appear brilliant, if you'll let them.

*Colonel Jay E. Vaughn is assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca as the TRADOC System Manager for Ground Based Common Sensor. He is a graduate of USMA and Tulane University's Graduate School of Business Administration. He served as an infantry company commander in the 4th Infantry Division in Vietnam and was the first commander of the 105th MI Battalion, 5th Infantry (M) Division, Fort Polk, LA.*

## NIJMEGEN: A Lesson in Team Building

By First Lieutenant Deborah Hanagan

The first time I heard about it was 2 years ago when I was a platoon leader. Although, one of my soldiers was on the team, I had only a sketchy idea of what it was all about because she was training all the time and was detached from my platoon, so I rarely saw her.

What am I referring to? The International 100 Mile Nijmegen Marches. It's an annual summer event in Nijmegen, Holland, that attracts civilians and military teams from all over the world. The objective is to test esprit and endurance by ruck marching 100 miles in 4 days.

At the time, 2 years ago, I thought it sounded like insanity. Who, in their right mind, would subject their feet to that kind of abuse? I had vivid memories of ruck marches I had completed in MIOBC and Air Assault School and I distinctly remembered the sensation of "hamburger feet" I always got whenever I walked a long distance. My feet just seemed to be blister-prone.

However, as I heard more about it, my curiosity peaked. I heard about the great time the soldiers had meeting foreign soldiers from places like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. There seemed to be more to it than just pounding the pavement for 4 days.



## ***"What I learned...was much more than just how to endure marching 100 miles."***

This year I got the chance of a lifetime. While at work, I heard first hand about problems the brigade was having fielding a team and appointing an OIC. I piped up, thinking I may as well take the plunge, and suddenly found myself in charge. What I learned from that experience was much more than just how to endure marching 100 miles. The whole Nijmegen experience, from training to competing, turned out to be an excellent leader development exercise; perfect junior officer development that, for me, ranked up there with platoon leader time. What valuable leader lesson did I learn? Team building. Building a team from a group of soldiers holding diverse specialties in three different battalions turned out to be very challenging and eminently rewarding.

### **Building the Team**

The steps I took with the team in order to be successful turned out to be simple and logical. We started out with only 9 weeks to train, and I've got to admit, I was somewhat daunted; and several commanders also thought we couldn't do it. We kept our heads, though, and maintained our enthusiasm, and plunged right in.

The first thing I did was establish a goal: to train up well enough so that all 14 team members would complete the march. I calculated the personnel, equipment, and time requirements and, with the advice of previous competitors and experienced ruck marchers, drafted up a training plan. I also picked my NCOIC, the guy I'd be heavily relying on to make sure we did quality training. Together, we set training standards. We opened up the team to everyone in the brigade, but published a list of requirements the final team would have to meet: things like showing up for training on time, participating in all training (unless there was a good reason to miss it), supporting one another, keeping a positive attitude, and finishing all the training marches.

I briefed all the commanders beforehand and kept a continuous line of communication open to resolve conflicts along the way. It turned out to be a good thing, too. As expected, the word sometimes didn't get out and some supervisors com-

plained about the amount of time our training took. At times, I became extremely frustrated. It seemed that as soon as I resolved one problem another one popped up.

We started out with a group of 20 people. We ended up with a team consisting of linguists, both interrogators and communications interceptors; wheeled vehicle and generator mechanics; RATT rig operators and communications repairers; and even some 11B long-range surveillance (LRS) soldiers. Ages ranged from late teens to mid thirties. We had men and women, including a married couple. As the weeks went by, this diverse group was able to come together into a cohesive team.

The toughest part was staying motivated and sticking to our training schedule. As a staff officer for a year and a half, I'd forgotten what a struggle it is getting everyone together and trying to get to know everyone, while dealing with personality conflicts and coordinating details like supplies, administration, and transportation.

I suppose I was shocked; I'd expected it to be easy and I thought everything would just work out. But I realized that if I was going to be the leader of this thing, I needed to act like one. I pulled myself out of my shell and took some risks. I opened myself up to the team and gave them all I had. And you know, when I did that, I wasn't afraid anymore. That wonderful enthusiasm that seems to be inherent in all young soldiers came spilling out; and although we had problems all the way up until the end, they weren't overwhelming. We soon developed a bond of mutual respect and camaraderie.

One thing I learned was how important it was to talk to the team. I continually gave pep talks and asked for feedback. I wanted to know their problems and concerns. Whenever we had problems that affected the whole group, we sat down together and talked about them. I kept reinforcing how important it was that we look out for one another and work together. We had to be honest with each other.

## ***"I'm proud to acknowledge that my NCOIC did an outstanding job."***

But don't think I was always out front yelling encouragement. I'm a quiet leader who observes the situation and only steps in when there's a problem or a teaching point. I let my NCOIC run the daily training. He delegated each day's march

routes to different soldiers on the team. They were responsible for planning the route, then leading us. I interfered as little as possible with my NCOIC's business, and then only when he asked for help. I'm proud to acknowledge that my NCOIC did an outstanding job. I was able to give him an idea of what I wanted, then sit back and watch things "magically" happen. He was dedicated and innovative.

I'm a firm believer that adversity is a great teacher. None of the soldiers had ever done a ruck march like this before. Our challenges were as much psychological as they were physical. Not only did we have to toughen our feet and backs, but also our minds. We had to go beyond pain and push ourselves past previous limitations. Fortunately, the jokes kept right on coming, and I learned to appreciate each person's uniqueness.

As I mentioned before, our problems continued up until the last minute. We arrived at Nijmegen with the required team of 14 marchers (including me), an administrative NCO, and a medic; but one of the marchers was brand new, having joined the team only a week before. At first, I wasn't happy getting a new member so late in the game, but he turned out to be one of the most dedicated members we had. I have a lot of admiration for him, because although he was an LRS type and ruck marched all the time, he wasn't nearly as well prepared as the rest of us. However, when we finally did make it to Nijmegen, we all felt confident that we were as ready as we were ever going to be.

### **The Nijmegen Marches**

The whole town of Nijmegen makes a holiday out of the 4 days of marching. All the military teams stayed at a tent city called Camp Heumensoord, and the support they gave us was phenomenal. It was like 4 days of ticker-tape parades. I'll never forget all those people lined up on the sides of the roads, waiting for us at four in the morning, and staying there until the last soldier passed, some time in the afternoon. They gave us cheers, smiles, and sometimes even flowers. Naturally, the kids begged for souvenirs and we obliged by passing out tiny American flags and stickers.

***"The whole thing made us proud to be American soldiers."***

The whole thing made us proud to be American soldiers. Suddenly, I really understood what our presence here in Europe means. We **mat-tered** to all those people! Although the marches were hard and we got tired and sore, we never lost our motivation, because those people inspired us. My team was so determined to finish with all 14 members that they took a voluntary oath to abstain from alcohol until the end of the march. That was a pretty mature decision considering the beer tent was just across the street. I guess it paid off because we all finished. Naturally we had some rough spots during the course of the march, times when someone was a razor's edge from quitting, but somehow we weathered all the crises.

Walking into the assembly area before our final pass-in-review was one of the most emotional moments of my life. I felt so proud of the team as we marched up to our brigade and battalion commanders. I wanted to hug each soldier. I wanted to laugh and sing and cry. I wanted to tell them that I knew all along we'd all finish, because our team integrity was so strong. We looked out for each other and everyone gave 110 percent all the time. I was proud to be able to show our commanders that we were the kind of soldiers that can tackle a really difficult task and perform with distinction.

So, in the long run (march?), What did I gain as a young officer? I think I grew miles as far as leader development is concerned. I developed a keener appreciation for the Officer/NCO relationship. I improved my interpersonal relationship abilities, and I improved my skills at managing the details involved in planning, coordinating, directing, and executing. My feeling of self-confidence increased and I feel more comfortable being in a position of responsibility. I have a healthy respect for the value and power of teamwork. I will always feel a special bond with each of the soldiers on the team, and Nijmegen '90 will always occupy a privileged place in my memory.

Would I do the Nijmegen marches again? You bet I would, and I'd recommend it to anyone.

*First Lieutenant Deborah L. Hanagan works on the brigade staff of the 207th MI Brigade, S3 Section, and is stationed in Ludwigsburg, Germany.*

# CAREER NOTES

**ORB/PHOTO/FICHE:** We here at MI Branch cannot emphasize enough how important these three items are for continued success as an MI Officer.

- **ORB:** Keep your Officer Record Brief accurate. Updates start with your local Personnel Service Company.

- **PHOTO:** Make sure it shows your correct rank and branch insignia. Update every 5 years or as needed.

- **FICHE:** Keep a current copy and check for accuracy and completeness. Obtain fiche by writing to Commander, Personnel Command, Attn: TAPC-MSR-S, 200 Stovall St., Alexandria, VA 22332.

Special Background Investigations also must be updated every 5 years. Start your update in a timely manner! Check with your local security officer or special security officer for details. It's important!

Remember, officers other than regular Army need to apply for voluntary indefinite status between their 81st and 87th month of active federal commissioned service. This currently affects year groups 83 and 84.

Submit all personnel actions to MI Branch in writing (no telephone calls) on DA Form 4187. Please track all actions through your chain of command before calling for a status. Allow 2 to 3 weeks for processing once action arrives at MI Branch.

A suggestion for junior MI Officers interested

in career options: Check with senior intelligence officers in your area! They can offer useful advice and assistance to you, based on their experience and knowledge of the MI community. You can also call Promotion Branch, (AV) 221-9340 or OER Branch, (AV) 221-8661.

For the status of retirement, voluntary indefinite, or branch transfer paperwork, call AUTOVON to these sections of the Professional Services Branch: Combat Support Arms Division, 221-9340; MI Branch, 221-0143 or 221-0145; Branch Information Tape, 221-0144; MI Warrant Officers, 221-7841; MI Enlisted Branch, 221-3460/3462.

## Promotion Boards

Zone dates for the FY91 colonel and lieutenant colonel selection boards are set. Tentative zone dates for other boards have also been established. Use them for planning purposes only.

**Colonel, 0-6, Army Competitive Board:** AZ, 870401 and earlier; PZ, 870402 to 880401; BZ, 880402 to 900401.

**Lieutenant Colonel, 0-5:** AZ, 860101 and earlier; PZ, 860102 to 861201; BZ, 861202 to 880401.

**Major, 0-4:** AZ, 840601 and earlier; PZ, 840602 to 850501; BZ, 850502 to 860901.

**Captain, 0-3, 6-month zone:** AZ, 890930 and earlier; PZ, 891001 to 900430. 1-year zone: AZ, 890930 and earlier; 891001 to 900930.

## IDTN Cancellation

The Intelligence, Doctrine, and Training Notes (IDTN), a semiannual publication of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, has been canceled. The publication was redundant to other Intelligence Center publications.

Those of you who used IDTN may get your information out through two other channels: The Intelligence Center's Monthly Significant Activities Report (MSAR) and MIPB. Use the following guidelines for submission:

- Intelligence Center activities should continue to report important information in the MSAR. The MSAR is mailed monthly to every G2, MI

battalion and brigade, and significant MI activities worldwide. This distribution puts your information in the hands of the MI Corps' key leaders, and does so in a much more timely manner than IDTN did.

- Activities with proponenty information that needs to get in the hands of every member of the MI Corps should submit a short paragraph to the Office of the Chief of MI (OCMI). OCMI will have a regular column in MIPB starting in July. OCMI's mailing address is: Commander, USAIC, ATTN: ATSI-MI (Mr. Delajoux), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.



# TOTAL FORCE



By Colonel Joseph T. Mesch

## DESERT STORM Lessons Learned

As military professionals, we are obligated to evaluate and improve. DESERT STORM's partial mobilization of the Total Force provides a clear opportunity for lessons learned.

Our mobilization planning has been geared to a NATO scenario. Yet, we used elements of this plan to mobilize for war in Southwest Asia. The differences in these mobilization processes need to be addressed and any problems remedied as we prepare for the next contingency.

I want to review some of these mobilization situations as they applied to the Intelligence Center, and to invite your comments.

## Intelligence School Augmentation

Some 30 percent of Fort Huachuca's permanent party left to participate in DESERT STORM. Yet, we had an increase in training requirements, as part of TRADOC's "expanding the training base" mobilization mission. Early on, U.S. Army Forces Command required us to help mobilize National Guard combat brigades. These were round-out units to deployed Active Component (AC) divisions. The mission was to qualify Guard soldiers in MI slots. This task became incredibly complicated for several reasons:

•Activities with nonproponency information should submit it to MIPB. The address is inside the front cover.

We reserve the right to not publish information we feel is inappropriate to put in either the MSAR or MIPB.

NOTE: MSAR recipients should disseminate the information in it locally as appropriate. If you don't receive the MSAR currently and feel you should, contact the Center's executive officer, AUTOVON 821-1145 or commercial (602) 533-1145.

1. We had no off-the-shelf course geared to DESERT STORM.

2. Guard officers assigned to MI slots had almost no MI training.

3. Time constraints from other Guard training requirements nationwide played havoc with scheduling training at Fort Huachuca.

4. No instructors were assigned to the Intelligence Training Army Area School (ITAAS) troop unit.

5. The early mobilization process only allowed Individual Ready Reserve and Individual Mobilization Augmentee volunteers to be activated as instructors, which impacted on release from civilian employment.

6. The 6th Army ITAAS, which was given this mission, was home-based in Los Alamitos, California, not Fort Huachuca.

Even with these problems, the process all came together. The Commanding General made Guard training an MI Proponent priority. The MI Total Force cooperated by developing a DESERT STORM MI Officer Transition Course to help train the Guard soldiers. As the mobilization process expanded, TRADOC mobilized the 6th Army ITAAS in total. The 6th Army ITAAS left California and set up a home base here at Fort Huachuca. A permanent facility was turned over to them in addition to their other operations building. But, for the most part, the staff and faculty were integrated into permanent staff as instructors, executive officers, and School staff to fill vacant AC slots.

The bottom Line is that the MI Proponent needs a Reserve Forces Intelligence School here at Fort Huachuca—the home of Military Intelligence. We need such an entity to help develop and reconfigure AC MI courses. We need a year-round tie between the AC and Reserve Component (RC) to ensure doctrinal symmetry, to complement the component's teaching skills, and to simply work together routinely to train the MI Total Force in peace and war.

We know not every RC soldier requiring MI training can come to Fort Huachuca. But it doesn't necessarily follow that a separate ITAAS

should exist in each Army area. As requirements come up, the "Reserve Forces Intelligence School—Huachuca" could approve and establish detachments in locations such as Fort Meade or Fort Bragg for summer training. In this way, we could avoid unnecessary duplication of classes, ensure maximum attendance by filling all seats, ensure instructors are recharged regularly at the Intelligence Center, and provide quality control from the Proponent.

The ITAASs have performed extremely well over the years. But as force structure changes produce a smaller AC, there'll be a significant flow of trained and cleared AC soldiers who want to participate as citizen-soldiers. We in the Total Force must take advantage of this and recruit high quality prior-service soldiers. The AC downsizing will thus lessen ITAAS teaching requirements.

A more efficient Reserve Forces Intelligence School will not only give us a better return on investment but would also ensure instructors maintain a close relationship with the MI Proponent and are current on doctrine. We need a system that works not only in peacetime but also during mobilization.

Please give me your comments on how you think our Reserve Forces Intelligence School should function.

***"Division commanders are ill served by a combat arms officer who is just 'passing through' the MI slot on the way to bigger and better opportunities."***

#### **Life Cycle Model for RC MI Soldiers**

The AC has a model to develop a well-rounded and professionally developed MI Officer. Yet, we in the Reserve Forces do not. Although, it's probably more important to have such a model in the RC because of our limited training times and the importance of solid intelligence in battle.

The MI Proponent is working to develop such a model. We need your help in laying out a pattern of mobility for lieutenants through colonels. Every new lieutenant going to an RC MI slot is branched MI and attends the MIOBC AC course at Fort Huachuca. All lieutenants, regardless of

component, attend the same MIOBC. Therefore, there's no reason to assign a non-Branch-qualified lieutenant to an RC MI slot. Our dilemma occurs at the captain and major ranks and results from geographic and component differences.

For example, the combat divisions and the corresponding G2 sections are in the National Guard, while the divisional MI battalions are in the Reserve. There's very little opportunity to move between components to develop as an MI officer. Some soldiers have made the move but then have difficulty returning to their original component. Yet, we in the Proponent believe, for example, that a division G2 should have served as a platoon leader in an MI battalion and progressed through a series of MI slots culminating in G2 and battalion commander. We're working with senior Guard and Reserve leadership to sanction a Memorandum of Understanding that would allow the crossing of components and the detailing to slots without officers losing their identity in their original component. Division commanders are ill served by a combat arms officer who is just "passing through" the MI slot on the way to bigger and better opportunities. The RC lieutenants who comprise 60 percent of the MI basic courses and are the core of our professionalism deserve this model.

We also need a model for states without divisions. Some have combat brigades that require trained S2s. Let's not repeat the unfortunate experience of the three mobilized Guard Round-Out brigades who filled most of their MI slots with non-MI officers. It's impossible to teach a "quick and dirty" course to prepare a brigade intelligence staff for combat, regardless of the caliber of these combat arms officers. We need MI professionalism more than ever in the Reserve Forces, and we need it at all levels, from S2 slots to the state intelligence officer.

We need your help to make this happen. We will schedule in-progress reviews and circulate memoranda of understanding, but we need your support.

*Colonel Joseph T. Mesch is the Reserve Forces Advisor to the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. He can be reached at AV 821-1176; Commercial (602) 533-1176; home (602) 459-6893; or by mail, Commander, USAIC, ATTN: ATSI-RA, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.*

# TRAINING NOTES

## **Search for A Linguist: The DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM Experience and Beyond**

**By Staff Sergeant (P) Paul B. King**

The competent linguist is nearly an extinct species in today's Total Army. What we need are linguists who are not only experts in their jobs, but can speak foreign languages like natives. At present, there are too few linguists in the Army, and many of them possess skills that are in various stages of decay. This situation exists because of major structural flaws in the Army's linguist management system. Here, I will define some of the problems and point out possible solutions.

Two major structural flaws center around the maintenance of language skills and the management of linguists in the Army—both Active Duty and Reserve forces. To clarify the problem, I'll explain the current system used to create and manage linguists.

MI soldiers get foreign language training in only a few selected MOSs: Interrogation (97E), voice intercept (98G), and, in some cases, counterintelligence (97B) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysis (98C). These specialties vary greatly in the particular language skills they emphasize. For example, 98G's must be excellent listeners in their target language, because their job is to listen to voice traffic in foreign languages; but, 97E's must be excellent speakers of the language as well, because their job requires them to speak to enemy prisoners of war. Remember, job and language skills are tailored to match mission requirements.

When enlistees enter the Army in one of the above specialties, they go to the Defense Language Institute (DLI) immediately after basic training. The theory is if soldiers can't pass language school, they shouldn't go on to get the MOS. Most language courses are 11 months long, and are crammed with 5 years worth of college level instruction. Not everyone can quickly assimilate this volume of information, and a number of soldiers fail. The soldiers who do graduate as linguists continue their training at an MOS-producing school, and then get their assignments: Active Duty go to various locations; Reserves go back to

the parent unit.

Up to this point, there are no major problems with the management system. However, problems begin once linguists report to their units. Unless they go to an overseas assignment in their target language area or to a "real-world" language mission, there are few opportunities to maintain their language skills.

Nevertheless, linguists are expected to maintain these skills. They must do so while meeting other unit and soldier requirements, such as physical training, common task and squad or section training, vehicle and equipment maintenance, and "pulling" duty. Of course these duties are important, but they often come at the expense of language training, unless command emphasis is put there, as well. Often, command emphasis doesn't exist because there's no Army level system by which commanders are held responsible for their soldiers' language proficiency.

Often, stateside linguists have little opportunity to use their languages off-duty, and no "real-world" language mission while on-duty. In fact, many MI interrogation exercises are conducted in English and don't incorporate language performance at all! The same is true for voice intercept operator exercises. A few linguists are fortunate enough to be in units where, through enlightened commanders, good language training opportunities are in place. Unfortunately, this seems to be the exception rather than the rule. The result is frustrated linguists who aren't prepared when a war comes and eventually leave the Army.

Another problem exists in the way the Army manages linguists after DLI. A personal example may illustrate this point. Last December, I received a call from a unit being mobilized, requesting an Arabic linguist to complete its mission and personnel needs. My unit had two Arabic-Egyptian linguists, both with different MOSs. The request was not unusual, but what happened afterwards identified a major structural flaw in the current linguist management program.

The structural flaw starts with the Army's

inability to quickly locate and categorize its trained linguists. In the request I received, the other unit failed to identify the right type of linguist, so they (and we) didn't look for the "right" MOS. The unit actually needed an Arabic linguist with the interpreter skills of an interrogator; what they initially received was a SIGINT analyst with good listening skills. Both knew Arabic, but because of their jobs, their language skills varied considerably. We corrected the problem and the unit received the Arabic-Egyptian interrogator. Undoubtedly, this problem will reoccur Armywide if not corrected.

At present, officials have no way of finding out quickly what linguists are available in both Reserve and Active Component, where they are, and what proficiency they currently have. To correct this deficiency, we need a more comprehensive management system to better use the linguists we have. DA must create an Armywide linguist computer data base which lists all linguists by language first, then MOS and language proficiency testing levels. It should also include the linguist's status, unit or home address, and phone number, so Reservists can be "called up" when needed. We should update this data base quarterly with input from each major command.

We must not only train our linguists, but we must also use them if we expect them to be fully language capable and available for contingencies like DESERT SHIELD. To solve the Armywide training problems I've discussed, we must—

1. Develop standard training packages for foreign language intelligence collection exercises or other training that uses foreign languages for translation, interpretation, gisting, and transmissions.

2. Provide actual overseas training opportunities in which linguists could participate.

3. Restructure field exercises to accommodate certain language requirements. Instructors need to combine intelligence collection training and language training. They could pool linguists from various units to support the play, while at the same time allowing them to practice their languages. We should pay particular attention to the MOS and language needs of the exercise.

We must make better use of our linguists; we cannot let their skills die from neglect. I have been told the problem of declining proficiency lies with us—the linguists; and that this will not change. But I refuse to believe this, and I refuse to give up!! A clear and concise attack on the problem is needed and MUST occur in order for the Army to produce and retain genuine "Linguists."

*Staff Sergeant (P) Paul B. King is a member of the Active Guard Reserve. He's a Russian language translator and foreign language program manager with the 651st MI Company (Imagery Exploitation) (EAC), Pasadena, CA. He has served many Active Duty and Reserve tours as an interrogator. He's currently working toward a B.A. degree in Russian.*

## Southwest Asia Subcourse Offered

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center's Extension Training Team is developing ACCP Subcourse IS 3008, Preparation for Assignment in Southwest Asia. The subcourse covers organization of Iranian and Iraqi ground forces; history, weather, and lines of communication of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; and identification of Iranian and Iraqi weapons and equipment.

The U.S. Army Training Support Center will probably field this subcourse in June 1991. If you wish to take it, submit DA Form 145 to the Insti-

tute for Professional Development, Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5168. Enrollees will get 15 credit hours for successful completion. Active duty sergeants and below will also receive three promotion points; Reserve and National Guard sergeants and below will receive five promotion points.

For more information, call the Institute at Fort Eustis, AUTOVON 927-2079 or commercial (804) 878-2079. Points of contact at Fort Huachuca are Fred Kremer and Gayle Hammel, AUTOVON 821-2352 or 821-3365.



## Evolving Interrogation Doctrine

by Staff Sergeant Kenneth A. Chick

Interrogation doctrine is undergoing major changes right now as a result of lessons learned in Operation DESERT STORM. These lessons, as well as those learned in Panama and Grenada, will be reflected in the new FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation.

Specific interrogation problems experienced during the DESERT STORM operation are being identified. They probably will be similar to those that have beset interrogation operations for the past 50 years, such as—

- Too many sources (documents, prisoners, and civilian detainees) for too few interrogators.
- Coordination and communication problems in tasking interrogation assets.
- Slow reporting of collected information to echelon commanders.
- No uniformity in Interrogation of Prisoner of War (IPW) cage operations among similar echelons within the same theater.
- No clear guidance as to the division of responsibilities for handling prisoners and collecting information from them.
- How to use interrogators in the Persian Gulf area who don't speak Arabic.
- How to use soldiers who do speak Arabic but are not interrogators.
- How to use interrogators in postwar security operations.

In an effort to resolve these and other interrogation issues, FM 34-52 will—

- Simplify the exploitation process so interrogators can examine more sources in less time.
- Use the tasking process in FM 34-2, Collection Management and Dissemination, for interrogation operations.
- Shorten and standardize reporting formats to ease communication net overload.
- Describe operational procedures common to running all IPW cages.
- Clearly state responsibilities for each staff officer, MI commander, and military police in handling prisoners and collecting information from them.
- Describe how commanders can use interrogators whose languages don't match the current mission.
- Give commanders the procedures for using Arabic-speaking soldiers who are not interroga-

tors, as functional battlefield HUMINT collectors.

- Use the procedures in FM 34-60, Counterintelligence (CI), for teaming interrogators with CI agents to expand security capabilities in peacekeeping or low-intensity conflict operations.

- Tell commanders how to use interrogators in peacetime and how to maintain interrogators' language proficiency.

- Discuss organization and control of interrogation support to DOD counternarcotics efforts.

The chapters of the new FM 34-52 explain the doctrine, and the appendices explain specific tactics, techniques, and procedures. In other words, the chapters cover what is common to all interrogation operations, while the appendices are organized as pullout guides for the MI battalion commander, the senior warrant officer, the combat commander, etc.

An important doctrinal update in the new field manual discusses the use of interrogators in peacetime. The book discusses various types of non-war missions a commander might assign to the interrogator. These include interpreter duties, support to hostage negotiations, support to counternarcotics and CI operations, embassy duty, treaty verification, overt observer functions, and open foreign source collection.

One of the appendices deals exclusively with the language issue. It's a pullout pamphlet titled "The Commander's Guide to Language Maintenance." It establishes the need for an Armywide listening, reading, and speaking standard of 2/2/2 or better on the Defense Language Proficiency Test for foreign language proficiency. It also discusses training methods and funding issues.

The project team revising FM 34-52 has removed the requirement for the fieldwide use of a Tactical Interrogation Report (TIR). Interrogators normally need to know just two report formats: The Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, and Equipment (SALUTE) Report, and the Intelligence Information Report (IIR). Each individual unit will decide, based on its specific operational requirements, whether to use any other kind of report, such as a TIR, a Translation Report, or a Screening Report.

The most important difference between the old edition of FM 34-52 and the current draft is the focus. In the old edition, analysts of interrogation reports bore the primary responsibility for extracting answers to the commander's PIR.

Therefore, the individual interrogator simply collected as much information as possible and passed it on to the analyst. In the revised manual, the interrogator's job no longer is simply to "collect the most information in the least amount of time." Now, the interrogator, through specific information requirements based on the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and indicators, collects the most information to help answer the PIR in the least amount of time. The new manual clearly ties interrogation operations to the simple premise for all intelligence collection: "The sole purpose of interrogation operations is to answer the supported echelon commander's PIR."

FM 34-52 will go to the field as an unapproved coordinating draft this month. A coordinating draft represents the proponent's position and thoughts. It does not mean the concepts, techniques, and procedures are carved in stone.

Anyone may comment on FM 34-52, and comments don't require chain of command endorsement. Interrogators and others concerned with HUMINT collection should seek out their unit's copy of the draft, examine it closely, and forward

any comments and recommendations back to Fort Huachuca. The project team will review and evaluate each one for its inclusion in the final draft. Forward all comments, along with the rationale for each one, on DA Form 2028. Submit changes for improving FM 34-52, or any other MI field manual, to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATSI-TDL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000.

The project team would also appreciate any historical and statistical examples that illustrate particular interrogation methods or the importance of interrogation operations in general. Please include the source of any illustration you submit.

**Staff Sergeant Kenneth A. Chick**, an interrogation instructor at Fort Huachuca, is currently serving on the project team to revise FM 34-52. He recently served as project officer for FM 34-54, *Battlefield Technical Intelligence*, and has written chapters for several other recently published MI field manuals. He's a graduate of the University of the State of New York and Pittsburg State University, Kansas.

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## VANTAGE POINT *(continued from page 2)*

FORSYTH in FAISS and GOLDWING employment and training.

Capping these efforts, PEOIEW, INSCOM, and AIA performed herculean feats from the outset in supporting DESERT SHIELD/STORM. AIA, in particular, supported all aspects of the operation and every echelon from the DA staff down to all forces in Southwest Asia with tailored products. As I said, this has been a true community effort. The MI units and staffs in country clearly bore the brunt, but the entire branch can be proud of how we pulled together to support them.

Now to challenges. From my perspective, there are four major challenges we must face head on to ensure our branch remains not only viable and pertinent, but the key to victory on any future battlefield. We must—

1. Adjust to new budget realities which will translate into a significantly smaller Army (and MI Branch) and reduced funds for modernization.
2. Incorporate and adapt to a new war-fighting doctrine which will place significantly increased demands on intelligence.
3. Properly assess rapid and wide-ranging technological advancements, to ensure we pursue only those that provide the greatest value added, while ensuring we design our systems to enable them to accept new technology insertions in an affordable and efficient manner.
4. Prepare our personnel, military and civilian, so they can successfully provide intelligence support during the period of rapid and sweeping change that is going to occur over the course of this decade and beyond.

Smaller defense budgets are a foregone conclusion. We will be a smaller Army by 1995, probably on the order of 535,000. Armywide, we'll have significantly less money for force modernization. As a consequence, we're going to have to design more efficient organizations, eliminating unjustified redundant capabilities in and between echelons and making hard choices between systems and the echelons at which they will be fielded. Combat value added is the clear discriminator, and we must be able to articulate this for each of our systems based on what it does, where it does it, and how that translates into enhanced combat power. We also must be able to demonstrate that we have established an affordable approach to

acquire our new capabilities and to upgrade them affordably as technology permits. As I mentioned in the last issue, at the moment, all our IEW flagship systems are funded for fielding this decade, but we must continue to be able to demonstrate how they contribute as our war-fighting doctrine changes. We also need to be prepared to make hard choices between our flagship systems, if future budget cuts place our present funding status in jeopardy. Clearly, our system of intelligence systems approach is more critical than ever, as is coherence between EAC and ECB.

Our evolving war-fighting doctrine is precipitated by the fact that we're going to have a smaller, largely CONUS-based Army, but one with significantly enhanced intelligence, deep fires, and mobility. Our basic orientation will be power projection from the CONUS base as opposed to forward deployment as we are today. Consequently, deployability and versatility become critical features in our organizations and systems. We are participating as full partners in rewriting AirLand Battle-Future (ALB-F) and are working closer than ever with INSCOM to make sure we achieve the right balance and total coherence between EAC and ECB.

Rapid changes in technology will present an enormous challenge for us from now on. The temptation will always be there to pursue that which is faster or brighter, but affordability and critically measured combat value added must be the key discriminators. Fortunately, we have agreed with PEOIEW on an architectural approach which will allow us to keep up with technology on an affordable basis, for the most part, by changing computer boards instead of buying new terminals. Our structured participation in the Army Acquisition Corps should also help us manage system acquisition and technology insertion more effectively.

On the downside, we have a deficiency today in the number of personnel in our branch capable of accurately measuring the value added of new technology; consequently, we're too often at the mercy of others. We must begin a concerted effort to raise a group of officers and civilians who truly understand the key technologies that can best leverage our capabilities.

To meet the challenge of preparing our personnel for the future, we must be both careful and aggressively innovative. We must be careful as we build down the Army and create new organizations, employing new systems, that we don't do something dumb that will leave less than viable

career opportunities for the soldiers and civilians assigned to MI. We must also be innovative to ensure that, as technology or budget decisions render certain specialties less pertinent, we restructure or consolidate to make them viable.

We've already begun the consolidation process. DA has already approved the consolidation of Strategic Electronic Maintenance MOS 33M, P, and Q into a single MOS, 33Y. I have also given my proponent offices at Fort Huachuca and Fort Devens guidance to begin looking at other promising consolidations: 33V with 33R; 96D with 96H; and 98D with 98H and 98K. If we decide to proceed, we'll make sure we do this smart and take care of our soldiers. We must also be prepared to create new specialties, as we're doing with the 96U, UAV Operator, and 97L, RC Linguist, to accommodate new capabilities or address readiness challenges.

We'll go ahead with these consolidations only if they meet these criteria: They must create a more viable MOS; they must result in measurable training efficiencies; and they must enhance our ability to support the intelligence requirements of ALB-F.

We also have challenges in the personnel assignment area where our inventory of captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels still lags authorizations, and joint requirements continue to increase at the expense of our tactical Army force. We're addressing this challenge with our "must fill" assignment policy I described in the

last issue of **Military Intelligence**; but this policy must be dynamic to keep pace with a changing Army. Our Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS) must also be adaptable, or we will put our outstanding civilian employees at risk, as well, for not being able to keep pace with change.

Finally, our training must be the most dynamic and innovative part of the total equation. If we want our Branch members to remain pertinent, they must stay current with threat, technology, and doctrine. This is not a trivial task, especially when you consider the pending reductions in our training budgets and staffs. We must clearly identify the skills and knowledge we must impart, and find innovative, affordable ways to do so. Computer assisted training and simulations appear to offer the most promising solutions, but they come with an expensive training development bill, which we either have to be prepared to pay or find new, more affordable training solutions.

The bottom line of this long article is: We're doing and have done extremely well as a Branch, as witnessed by our total support to Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. However, we clearly cannot rest on our laurels. The challenges of the future are imposing, indeed, but with your continued help we will continue to meet them and remain the key to victory on any battlefield, now and in the future.



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(Continued from page 5)

States at our own game. My point was and is this: The image of the Soviet Union has changed throughout the world. "Today, the world sees President Gorbachev winning the Nobel Peace Prize, not President Bush. Worldwide media show the United States leading military efforts against Iraq, while the Soviet Union unilaterally removes forces from Europe. I maintain that we have been upstaged at the public relations game.

I don't mean to imply that tomorrow the Soviets will be a greater threat than ever or that war is inevitable. I merely pointed out that the Soviet Union we have dealt with for the past 45 years is changing, and these changes might create a stronger USSR, which could threaten our national interests in the decades to come.

Second Lieutenant Drew Allan Swank  
D CO/204th MI BN  
Augsburg FRG

#### Dear Editor:

I enjoy your historical articles and read with pleasure the several historical reports in the January-March 1991 issue. I would, however, argue with Captain Austra's contention in his "The Battle of the Bulge: The Secret Offensive" that ULTRA failed "to provide the information that commanders had come to expect."

That suggestion is rejected by both Ralph Bennett (*ULTRA in the West*, London: Hutchinson and Company, 1979) and F.H. Hinsley, et al (*British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume III Part 2*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988). Both references cite specific ULTRA messages, of which

at least six were intercepted and decrypted by the end of September, 1944, and many others by mid December.

Typically, although Hitler had forbidden radio traffic about *Wacht am Rhein*, several Luftwaffe-associated messages were revealing. Japanese Embassy traffic from Berlin to Tokyo also yielded useful intelligence. After studying this traffic, Bennett concluded that, "Properly understood, (the ULTRA material) was more than enough to prevent the complete surprise the German offensive achieved." The official British history hazarded "the judgment that the British Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Intelligence Centre made a fundamental mistake...." That is, the ULTRA warning of the attack should have been treated with more respect. All staffs were looking for an end to the war before Christmas, and tended to overlook contrary indicators. General Patton (3d U.S. Army) was more resistant to the general euphoria.

Incidentally, the British Intelligence history was written in five volumes. Volume III has two separately-bound parts, and the last two volumes have just been published. Part 2 of Volume III addresses the Battle of the Bulge.

I would be greatly obliged if you would report on the intelligence that Admiral Canaris, Hitler's senior intelligence officer for much of the war, gave the Allies through Allen Dulles (OSS, Switzerland). His activities were revealed when secret 1947 Congressional hearings on the formation of the CIA were declassified in 1982.  
Major (ret) C.E. Hooker  
Canadian Army  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

#### Dear Editor:

I read with great interest Carolyn Saunders' article "Pedagogy vs. Andragogy: Are We Treating Our Students Like Children" in your January-March 1991 issue.

Some pedagogy is necessary with children and adults, but not much. Educators who use andragogy evolve students who are more creative, individual, innovative, inspired, enthusiastic, and challenged.

Why don't we use such methods throughout the Army from entry courses to the Army War College? I think the answer lies in some of the following areas. First, it's much more difficult to maintain control over students, and we do love control. Second, the methods Saunders proposes make it more difficult to evaluate students. It just doesn't fit nicely into present evaluation criteria systems.

Third, instructors and their bosses need very strong self concepts to risk using the andragogy method. When you turn adults loose they can be very challenging. They think of things the instructor hasn't thought of. The teacher or trainer must then respond to these new creative challenges. If the instructor is strong, everybody learns, including the instructor. Finally, all this takes more work on the part of students and instructors.

I applaud Carolyn Saunders for writing the article and you for publishing it. My hope is that the USAIC Commander encourages the use of these methods to educate all of us in the future.

Joseph M. Blair, III  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
III Corps and Fort Hood

(Continued from page 12)

launchers, we can anticipate that this may not be the last time that Iraq will threaten its neighbors. As analysts, we will have to keep our eyes on Iraq for a long time to come.

## End Notes

1. For an excellent explanation of the political and economic machinations which led to the Kuwaiti invasion, see Phebe Marr, "Iraq's Uncertain Future," *Current History*, Vol 90, No. 52, Jan 91, pp. 1-4, 39-42.
2. Several works discuss the initial Iraq offensive and why it failed. See the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1980-81* (London: IISS, 1981), pp. 49-52; Edgar O'Ballance, *The Gulf War* (London: Brassey's, 1988); John Laffin, *War Annual 1* (London: Brassey's, 1986); Anthony H. Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: The First Round," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Apr 82, pp. 32-47 and "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part II - Tactics, Technology, and Training," *AFJ*, Jun 82, pp. 68-85; and William O. Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis," Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, eds., *The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts* (New York: Praeger, 1983).
3. About 10 of these divisions belong to the Popular Army militia, which at best is barely functional. Reportedly, these occupy much of the front line in Kuwait.
4. Michael Evens, "Saddam's Military Strategy Causes Surprise in West," *The Times*, 25 Aug 90; see also John Broder and Douglas Jeal, "Iraqi Army: World's 5th Largest But Full of Vital Weaknesses," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 Aug 90; Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990), p. 16. Pelletiere and Cordesman contend that Iraq's 20 Special Forces Brigades come under the Guards control; more likely, they come under the 1st Special Corps.
5. The charts and the battalion strong-point diagram are taken from two U.S. Army publications. They are AIA-DS-1-90, *Identifying the Iraqi Threat and How They Fight*, Aug 90; and AIA-DS-2-90, *How They Fight: Desert Shield Order of Battle Handbook*, Sep 90.
6. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War: Vol II* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 355; also Pelletiere, op.cit., p. 16.
7. Gordon L. Rottman, "Saddam's Juggernaut of Armed Horde?" *International Defense Review*, Nov 90, p. 1241.
8. IISS, *The Military Balance 1989-1990*, p. 101.
9. William O. Staudenmaier, "Iran-Iraq (1980-)," *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World - Vol II*, Robert Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, eds. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985-), p. 225.
10. Helen Chapin, ed., *DA PAM 550-31, Iraq: A Country Study*, HQDA, 1990; and Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part II," *AFJ*, p. 73. For more current information on Iraqi obstacles, see "Breaching the Iraqi Line," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 Dec 90, p. 1223.
11. David Segal, in "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 66, No. 5, Summer 1988, pp.

956-957, claims that after 1984 the Iraqis abandoned their static defense in favor of "a more flexible defense." He claims that Iraq, using set-piece battles, deliberately lured the Iranians into kill zones and then counterattacked with combined arms forces. I do not think the Iraqis were that capable.

12. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Relying on Chemical Arms," *Washington Post*, 10 Aug 90; see also Cordesman, *The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87* (New York: Jane's 1987), pp. 19, 63-64, 97.
13. O'Ballance, *The Gulf War*, pp. 60-63. The tactics used in this battle were similar to those Segal mentioned (Footnote 11), but they were the exception, not the rule.
14. These numbers are from O'Ballance, who viewed the aftermath of the battle.
15. Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis," *The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts*, p. 40; Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part II," *AFJ*, p. 74.
16. Cordesman, *The Lessons of Modern War Vol II*, p. 440.
17. The War of the Cities was an ongoing contest between Iraq and Iran to attack each other's major cities. It turned decisively in Iraq's favor in the Spring of 1988 when modified Iraqi Scud-B missiles began to reach Tehran. Upwards of 150 to 200 missiles were fired, devastating Iranian morale.
18. Bernard E. Trainor, "Iraqi Offensive: Victory Goes Beyond Battlefield," *New York Times*, 20 Apr 88; and IISS, *The Military Balance 1989-1990* (London: IISS, 1989), p. 101.
19. Pelletiere, op. cit., has an excellent discussion of the overall campaign, which was named *Tawakalna ala Allah*, on pp. 25-40.
20. Karsh, op. cit., p. 44; Laffin, *War Annual 1*, p. 78; Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part II," *AFJ*, p. 74; and *The Lessons of Modern War: Vol II*, p. 356. Television footage of the Iraqi "withdrawal" from Kuwait indicates the importance of these transporters.
21. The chronology of this battle is pieced together from four accounts: James Bruce, "Gulf Battle Lines Continue to Shift," *JDW*, 30 Apr 88, pp. 838-839; John Laffin, *War Annual 3* (London: Brassey's, 1989), pp. 107-108; Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraq Launches Offensive on Faw Peninsula," *The Washington Post*, 18 Apr 88, pp. A17, A22; Trainor, "Iraqi Offensive: Victory Goes Beyond Battlefield," *New York Times*; and Cordesman, *The Lessons of Modern War: Vol II*, pp. 373-375.
22. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Iraqi Troops Recapture Big Oil Field," *New York Times*, 26 Jun 88.
23. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Relying on Chemical Arms," *Washington Post*, 10 Aug 90, pp. A25, 27.

Aaron Danis formerly served as S2, 4-64 Armor and Plans Officer, G2, 24th Infantry Division (M). He is currently an intelligence analyst in Washington, D.C. and an Army Reserve Captain with the Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (AITAC). He is a graduate of Norwich University and will soon receive his M.A. from George Washington University.

# PROFESSIONAL READING

**Russian Roulette: Afghanistan Through Russian Eyes** by Gennady Bocharov, translated from Russian by Alyona Kojevnikov, New York: Bessie/Harper Collins Publications, 1990, 188 pages, \$18.95.

Gennady Bocharov, a Russian investigative correspondent, has written one of the first, and certainly one of the definitive, Soviet views of the war in Afghanistan. Bocharov arrived in Afghanistan in February 1980, one month after the Soviet invasion, and returned regularly to chronicle this eyewitness account. The point of view expressed here is not only his, but the soldier's as well, whether the soldier be a private or General Boris Gromov, the final Soviet ground commander in 1988. In this age of *glasnost*, the story is straightforward, honest to the point of being brutal, and none too flattering to the Soviet Army.

The eight chapters are alternately titled either "The Journalist's Story," or "A Soldier's Tale." In the former Bocharov details his criticisms of the Soviet invasion. Viewing Soviet paratroopers and tanks guarding then Afghan leader Babrak Karmal's house, he muses, "I could not help remembering how many times I had seen similar sights in different parts of the world, and how quickly heavy armor becomes evidence of the impotence of an enforced regime." In criticizing the political aspects of the invasion, he paints a picture of Soviet leaders from the Kremlin to the embassy in Afghanistan as being nothing more than dogmatists, old men completely isolated from the realities on the ground.

These same leaders also kept the Soviet populace isolated from the true nature and extent of Soviet involvement. For much of the war, planes bearing the zinc coffins of dead soldiers flew to remote airfields at night, and the dead were furtively buried. Describing the journalists who covered the war (including him-

self), he writes, "Personal integrity remained an abstract concept....It was as worthless as an old doormat on which countless feet had been wiped. Reporters wrote what they were ordered to."

It is the soldiers' stories, however, that really shine. They are vignettes about naive young men who leave home and face the terrible reality of a conflict which at home is only seen as one's "internationalist duty." These soldiers were small-town farmers and schoolboys who had no concept of war. In one chapter, a soldier is wounded in an ambush and placed in a MEDEVAC helicopter. It is shot down, and he turns out to be the only survivor. Back home, he is made into a hero, "the luckiest soldier in Afghanistan." Semiparalyzed and embittered, he attends a reception in his honor at his old school. When it is his turn to speak, the luckiest soldier of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan can only bring himself to utter, "I serve the Soviet Union."

As can be expected, there are numerous allusions to the American experience in Vietnam. (Bocharov apparently spent some time in Southeast Asia.) Helicopters and water buffalo are now helicopters and camels. The *mujahedin* are called "spooks" due to their ghostlike qualities in combat, similar to how many American soldiers perceived the Vietcong. At the trial of a Soviet soldier accused of murdering Afghans, which the soldier claimed an officer ordered him to do, the soldier's defense "reminded the tribunal of the case of Lieutenant Calley...." While visiting hospitals and psychiatric wards, Bocharov recounts cases of post-traumatic stress syndrome, "which is the direct result of wars such as the one in Vietnam, and more recently, the one in Afghanistan." Bocharov clearly makes the link that Afghanistan is the Soviet Union's moral and spiritual Vietnam.

Bocharov's writing style is simple

and understated, much like Crane's *Red Badge of Courage*. This makes the anarchy of combat and the insanity of the hospitals seem even more hellish. It appears that the author's original intent and feeling were preserved through the translation, a difficult feat. Certainly Bocharov could have covered more ground (the book feels short at 188 pages), but perhaps the author felt it would have diluted the intensity and the feeling he put into it. Bocharov's ability to distill his country's Afghanistan experience down to its essence makes this book a gem. As he concludes, "And so it was during all those years of the war, the longest waged by Russia since 1813: The people lived in grief, and officialdom basked in the glory of doctrine."

**Captain Aaron Danis**  
Fairfax, VA



**Saddam Hussein — And The Crisis In The Gulf** by Judith Miller and Lavrie Myroie, New York: Times Books, Random House Inc., 1990, \$5.95.

The authors write a revealing book about Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein at a most opportune time. Born 53 years ago to a miserably poor, landless peasant family, deserted by his father, abused by a crude and illiterate stepfather, and ultimately raised during his teens by his greedy uncle, Saddam Hussein rules Iraq today with a tyrannical iron fist.



In his early years he murdered his opponents, including his relatives; attempted to assassinate his country's ruler; built his party's internal security apparatus, the *Jihaz Haneen* or "instrument of yearning"; and personally engaged in the torture of his own people. This book offers graphic portrayals of Hussein's sanctioned torture and human rights abuses against men, women, and children. It details the greed and gross abuses of power; it depicts how this one man has terrorized his own country and attempts to do the same to the entire region. It's a glimpse of what will be in store in the Middle East should Saddam Hussein succeed in his ruthless quest to control the Arab world and become the leader of an international power.

This especially well-written book is a must for every military professional, particularly those deployed on DESERT STORM, all Mid-East scholars and journalists, and any "would-be" pacifist who questions why this ultimate tyrant—The Butcher of Baghdad—must be stopped.

Major Ed Coet  
Fort Hood, TX

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**Who Will Win? A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War** by Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, forward by Sir Robert Thompson, Washington D.C.: Crane Russak, 1989, 151 pages, softcover.

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The main problem for a nation faced with insurgency and other variants of conflict short of war is to build a government that works. The military has only one function: to support the civil government in this building process. It is with this simple, straightforward perspective that the authors begin their very timely book. Billed as "a citizen's guide to effective counterinsurgency" and a summation of "the lessons that can be learned from what has been a long, thorough exposure to Communist or Communist-endorsed and aided insurgencies," this short book is a classic of its genre.

The text is well organized, with great clarity and a smooth style. It includes many insights born of the authors' considerable experience and

study, that the general reader can understand; yet it still provides one of the most lucid analyses of revolutionary conflict that has appeared in open Western literature in the past decade. Blaufarb and Tanham are concise, objective, and accurate. The book is interesting reading for anyone with more than a passing interest in such conflict.

- Blaufarb and Tanham provide excellent critiques of Maoist strategy and the Cuban foco variation. They explore the factors of persuasion and coercion, unconventional tactics, the role and integrity of the police, depoliticized military forces, popular support, effective intelligence, selectivity and constraint of military power, and civilian control of military operations in successful counterinsurgency. Their representative case studies of Oman, Vietnam, Guatemala, and the Philippines are balanced and insightful. Although their treatment of the plight of the Aquino government is somewhat dated, their assessment of the New People's Army and its method of establishing itself in areas over which central government control is weak is, in itself, worthwhile reading.

The worst I can say about the book is it should have had at least an abbreviated bibliography, and it could have used a few more maps to clarify its description of some historical events. Nonetheless, this book is an essential primer for any special operations or intelligence soldier involved in foreign internal defense or unconventional warfare. Government officials, academics, and other citizens involved with or just interested in American policies and practices in conflicts short of war should also read this book.

Major William H. Burgess III  
Fort Bragg, NC

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**Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam** by Orrin DeForest and David Chanoff, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990, 294 pages, \$19.95.

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In November 1968 Orrin DeForest arrived in Vietnam. The elections were over and Nixon was the new president. It was nine months before the Tet Offensive. So the stage was

set for DeForest's tenure as CIA's Chief Interrogator for Military Region Three in South Vietnam.

With 15 years to reflect on the events between 1968 and 1975, DeForest has provided a revealing account, both professional and personal, of his experience in Vietnam. The author voices some honest criticism of policies and methods the CIA employed in Vietnam.

The author joined the CIA in 1968 as Chief Interrogator for Military Region Three (Hau Nghia province) in Bien Hoa. DeForest's duties included inspecting the Provincial Interrogation Centers (PIC), training Vietnamese field officers in interrogation techniques, monitoring intelligence production, and spotting and cultivating operational agents from the Vietcong prisoners. In short, DeForest discovered upon his arrival in 1968 that the PICs were poorly run, the Phoenix program was slipshod and brutal, and the CIA had been unable to generate a single agent.

As in many books detailing the CIA during the collapse of Vietnam, Thomas Polgar, the CIA Chief of Station in Saigon, takes a battering by the author. Despite Polgar's reputation in South America, the author considered him a novice in Asia. Instead of depending on intelligence from the field, which described the situation as hopeless, Polgar depended on a Hungarian colonel from the International Control Commission who fed him false information about the chances of a negotiated settlement. DeForest and his peers would read Polgar's reports to Washington in disbelief, while their intelligence reports were buried and ignored. DeForest's version of the events of 1975 will no doubt hurt Polgar's reputation but his opinion deserves some respect in light of his professional reputation and experience.

Interestingly, another individual receives some negative attention. The author describes John Paul Vann, the star of Sheehan's *A Bright Shining Lie*, as "an abrasive man with a foul mouth" who has no understanding of the concept of "face" for the Asian mind. He would find a Vietnamese commander somewhere in the field and go out of his way to embarrass him in front of his troops. According to DeForest you



could not embarrass Vietnamese without the risk of making an enemy for life, one that would eventually get revenge. DeForest, was not surprised when Colonel Dinh mentioned that II Corps South Vietnamese Rangers hated Vann so much that they murdered him.

Beyond the obvious name-dropping, DeForest does demonstrate insight into interrogation techniques and the process involved in building an agent network from scratch. His descriptions of the last days of South Vietnam are ominous and remind the reader of Frank Snepp's *Decent Interval* (1978).

This book spans the critical years of the war and places great emphasis on lessons learned, both basic and complex. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the mechanics of intelligence as they were applied in Vietnam. DeForest provides the intelligence officer with valuable insight.

**Wendell L. Minnick**  
Norfolk, VA



**To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy** by Jorge I. Dominguez, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989, \$35.00.

Fidel Castro doesn't like the United States. This book explores the global implications of that simple statement.

Dominguez begins by defining the principles which guide Cuban foreign policy. Since Castro enjoys unchallenged leadership in Cuba, a search

for guiding principles inevitably becomes a search for Castro's motives. Understand Castro, and you understand the policy.

Enduring hostility towards the United States government and many U.S. values is the first principle of Cuban foreign policy. Dominguez does not analyze in-depth the origins of Castro's anti-Americanism, but he points out that it existed at an early stage of his political development. Dominguez quotes from a letter written by Castro in 1958, "I have sworn that the Americans will pay very dearly for what they are doing. When this war is over, a much longer and bigger war will begin for me: the war that I will make against them. I realize that this will be my true destiny."

Castro wrote this letter before he had any close ties to the Cuban Communist party or allegiance to Marxism-Leninism. It long pre-dates both the U.S. quarrel with Castro and his association with the Soviet Union. Deeply rooted in Cuban nationalism and the desire for radical change, anti-Americanism is central to Castro's ideology.

Castro came to power in January 1959. Hostility towards the United States was his first policy initiative. At the end of 1959, while the U.S. was still willing to aid the new government, Castro was going public with denouncements of his would-be benefactor.

Castro's perceived need for a shield against the U.S. threat was the impetus behind the Cuban-Soviet alliance which developed during 1959-60. U.S. willingness to compromise with Castro ended in March 1960, when President Eisenhower authorized the overthrow of the Cuban government. Thus, Cuban policy towards the United States and the Soviet Union was well established by 1961, the year Castro announced that he was a Marxist-Leninist and that his revolution was socialist.

Alliance with Moscow and hostility towards Washington should not suggest the Cuban foreign policy merely reacts to U.S. and Soviet initiatives. Dominguez convincingly argues that genuine conviction often motivates Cuban support for revolutionary movements and states. Rather than merely serving as a

Soviet surrogate, Cuba has taken the leading role in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Angola. The fact that these involvements are looked upon favorably by the Soviet Union and unfavorably by the United States is a secondary benefit.

Pragmatism, as well as hostility, has a place in Cuban relations with the United States. Routine cooperation occurs in some technical areas and certain tacit understandings occur. These understandings and areas of cooperation serve to reduce world tension and Dominguez argues that the two parties can and should develop them further. He concludes that Castro's Cuba and the United States will never be friends; yet there is much to respect on both sides.

The Cold War is not over in the Caribbean. Dominguez wisely resists the temptation to speculate on how changes occurring in the Soviet bloc may affect Cuba's future. This is a potential trap scholars should avoid; otherwise, their books may become dated even before they're published. Intelligence analysts, however, are paid to speculate on the future. For us, this book raises two questions. First, in light of improved East-West relations, how long can Castro maintain his adversarial relationship with the United States? Second, can Castro's brand of socialism survive without anti-Americanism?

**Second Lieutenant Richard Marx**  
Faribault, MN

**Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods** by Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, a Foreign Policy Institute Book, Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1990, ISBN 0-08-037429-8, hardcover, 386 pages, \$55.00.

Revolutions have become complicated in Latin America. That is one of the authors' themes in the seven chapters which form the conceptual one-third of this book. The other two-thirds is organized into a descriptive directory of armed revolutionary groups throughout Central and South America.

The authors' knowledge base and viewpoint establish a new level of sophistication among academic liter-

(Continued from page 5)

ature on this admittedly emotional topic. Revolution in contemporary Latin America is mostly of European intellectual origins, filtered into the Western Hemisphere since 1967 by Cuba and thereby rendered palatable. It is led, as Crane Brinton showed in his 1938 landmark *Anatomy of a Revolution*, not by the oppressed but by disaffected elements of the privileged class. The Catholic Church is heavily involved, in ways which will surprise many readers. Anti-leftist violence is on the rise. Its origins, say the authors, spring not from after-hours vigilantism by U.S.-influenced local armies, but from a spontaneous tide of a perceived need for self-defense.

While the definitional essays in the book are filled with insights, readers who do not specialize in Latin American revolutions will need the other two-thirds of the volume to understand the essays. Groups known by three Spanish initials abound in every sentence, as do obscure names. Thus, the directory portion is to the conceptual part what the periodic table of the elements is to the reader of a chemistry textbook: a necessary lexicon. The directory is impeccably accurate on organizational history, but has two curious dimensions.

The entry of Nicaragua is about the Sandinista National Liberation Front, the nation's legitimate government for 13 years. One would expect to see a directory of the Democratic Resistance ("Contras") instead. And Cuba's support role—financing, arming, training, role model—behind many Latin American guerrilla and terrorist groups is absent. The authors merely state that support for each group is domestic, external, or both.

This book belongs on the reference shelf of any scholar, journalist, or policy maker who would deal intelligently with Latin America in the 1990s.

**Russell W. Ramsey, Ph.D.**  
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL

**The Chronological Atlas of World War Two** by Charles Messenger, New York: Macmillan Publishing

Company, 1989, 249-pages, cloth, \$32.50.

This is an excellent atlas of the Second World War. The text is concise and maps are easy to understand. The method of presentation and the index combine to facilitate finding a specific incident. Messenger's reading list of nearly 100 key volumes on the War points readers to vital sources of additional information. I highly recommend this book to anyone who needs good reference material on World War Two.

**Captain Robert McMichael**  
Fort Huachuca, AZ

**Dynamics of Dependence, United States-Israeli Relations**, edited by Gabriel Sheffer, London: Westview Press, 1987, 210 pages, paperback.

This book is a series of lectures and papers presented in 1987 at the Hebrew University. It would be of great interest to social scientists examining the ebb and flow of our relations with Israel, but is of questionable value to the MI professional. A sampling of its chapters include, "Israel's Image," "Israeli Military Procurement from the United States," and "U.S. Aid to Israel—Problems and Prospectives."

For the MI professional, the book lacks that most special Israeli-U.S. relationship, the CIA and Mossad. In light of the Pollard case, a chapter on this relationship would have redeemed the work for the intelligence community; but that relationship was not the thrust of this work. Recommended for readers with an urge to "round-out" social information about the two countries.

**Captain Rick Ugino**  
Rochester, NY

**Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General** by Michael Schaller, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 320 pages, \$22.50 hardcover, ISBN: 0-19-503886-X.

Many critical biographers of General Douglas MacArthur have hinted that many of his attributes left something to be desired; Schaller lays the short-

comings out in a systematic way. The attributes ascribed to the General are what Schaller calls the myths. For instance, it's often said that MacArthur understood the Oriental mind like no one in Washington did. When examining the General's actions, statements made at press conferences and recommendations to decision-makers like the Joint Chiefs during the Korean War, the author shows that MacArthur's wisdom was no better than anyone else's and may have been worse.

Besides dispelling the common myths about MacArthur, Schaller provides the reader with a well-written and thoroughly researched biography of one of the most controversial commanders America has known. Details are laid out with a critical eye to resurrecting them later when discussing some myth of the General's greatness.

Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General is well written. The style is excellent. The use of primary sources, including some not seen before like the papers of Chinese Nationalist Ambassador Koo, is varied and shows the author's desire for depth. It's a good book and a welcome revisionist view of a controversial figure.

**Peter Charles Unsinger**  
San Jose State University, CA



# 307th Military Intelligence Battalion



*The eagle, known for its swiftness, stamina and keen vision, together with the key and electronic flashes symbolize eternal vigilance and security and allude to the basic mission of the organization. In addition, the eagles' heads adapted from the civic arms of the cities of Frankfurt and Ludwigsburg, Germany respectively, refer to the former and present home areas of the Battalion.*

Constituted December 11, 1951 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 307th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion. It was activated on December 27, 1951 in Germany and reorganized and redesignated June 25, 1955 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 307th Communications Reconnaissance Battalion. On July 1, 1956, it was reorganized and redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 307th Army Security Agency Battalion. It was inactivated October 15, 1957 in Germany. On July 1, 1974, it was activated in Germany. It was reorganized and redesignated October 16, 1983 as Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, 307th Military Intelligence Battalion. Concurrently, the 326th Army Security Agency Company was reorganized and redesignated as Company A, 307th Military Intelligence Battalion and the 330th Army Security Agency Company was redesignated as Company B, 307th Military Intelligence Battalion and activated in Germany.

Company A was constituted April 3, 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 126th Signal Radio Intelligence Company. It was activated August 14, 1942 at Camp Crowder, Mo. (less 1st Operating Platoon activated April 9, 1942 in Australia). The company was reorganized and redesignated September 1, 1945 as the 126th Signal Service Company. It was reorganized and redesignated in October 1951 as the 326th Communication Reconnaissance Company and allotted to the Regular Army. It was again redesignated in July 1956 as the 326th Army Security Agency Company. The company was inactivated in October 1957 in Japan. It was activated in May 1962 at Fort Bragg, N.C. and inactivated in February 1964 at Homestead Air Force Base, Fla. It was activated December 23, 1968 at Fort Riley, Kan. and inactivated at Fort Riley in April 1970. The company was activated May 3, 1971 in Germany. Company A is entitled to campaign participation credit for New Guinea and Luzon in World War II and the UN Summer-Fall Offensive; Second Korean Winter; Korea, Summer-Fall 1952; Third Korean Winter; and Korea, Summer 1953.

Company B was constituted November 26, 1943 in the Army of the United States as the 60th Signal Radio Intelligence Company. It was activated December 23, 1943 at Camp Crowder, Mo. It was reorganized and redesignated in May 1945 as the 60th Signal Service Company. In October 1951 it was reorganized and redesignated as the 330th Communication Reconnaissance Company and allotted to the Regular Army. It was redesignated in July 1956 as the 330th Army Security Agency Company and inactivated in October 1957 in Korea. On June 25, 1962 it was activated at Camp Wolters, Texas and inactivated in September 1971 in Vietnam. The company was activated November 5, 1973 in Germany and inactivated in May 1979 in Germany. It is entitled to campaign participation credit for the UN Offensive; CCF Intervention; First UN Counteroffensive; CCF Spring Offensive; UN Summer-Fall Offensive; Second Korean Winter; Korea, Summer-Fall 1952; Third Korean Winter; and Korea, Summer 1953; and for participation in Vietnam in the Counteroffensives, Phases II, III, IV, V, VI, VII; the Tet Counteroffensive; the Tet 69/Counteroffensive; Summer-Fall 1969; Winter-Spring 1970; Sanctuary Counteroffensive; and Consolidation I.

Commander

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